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Cognition In Nature: Information, Explanation, And Embodiment
Abstract
This dissertation advances a novel view about how to understand cognition as a phenomenon arising
from the coordination of brain, body, and environment. The project starts by articulating a question about
how to account for the characteristic, intentional nature of cognitive processes as based in a world
described by neurophysiology, chemistry, and physics. After posing this question and contextualizing and
previewing the sort of answer I develop, in Chapter 1, the proceeding three chapters each address a major
part of this puzzle about cognition in nature. Chapter 2 defends a view of Natural Information as Factive
and Nomic. I show how the reasoning behind non-Factive approaches conflates two different problems
with a Dretskean view. I argue one problem can be addressed by relying on a more precise understanding
of natural laws and law-like invariance, while the other – the reference class problem – is not something
to be solved in terms of a theory of information. In Chapter 3, I defend a view of the sense in which
dynamic relations “give rise to” cognitive processes, investigating the relation between a higher-level
phenomenon and its explanatory basis. I illustrate the features of dyamical systems models that play an
important role in this investigation of cognition, highlighting the way lower-order components can be
more global than then phenomena they give rise to. I then describe Constitutivism, which I take to be a
widespread idea about explanatory basis of cognition. I argue that Constitutivism does not provide a
plausible view of dynamically arising, higher-order phenomena that are local with respect to their
components. I therefore support an alternative, generative, dynamical view of the explanatory basis of
cognition. In Chapter 4, I advance a view of cognition as embodied, in the sense of arising with respect to
a particular body. Toward this end, I articulate an original, formal notion of the relevant kind of Body. I
argue that the examination of the explanatory role of the body has been limited by its focus on perception
and action, and offer an understanding of embodiment centered on the body itself.
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Abstract

COGNITION IN NATURE:
INFORMATION, EXPLANATION, AND EMBODIMENT
Ben Baker
Gary Hatfield, Lisa Miracchi

THIS DISSERTATION ADVANCES A NOVEL VIEW ABOUT HOW TO
UNDERSTAND COGNITION AS A PHENOMENON ARISING FROM THE
COORDINATION OF BRAIN, BODY, AND ENVIRONMENT. THE PROJECT
STARTS BY ARTICULATING A QUESTION ABOUT HOW TO ACCOUNT FOR
THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF COGNITION IN A WORLD COMPOSED OF THE
UNINTENTIONAL PROCESSES OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGY, CHEMISTRY, AND
PHYSICS. IN CHAPTER 1 I CONTEXTUALIZE AND PREVIEW THE BROAD SORT
OF ANSWER I WILL DEVELOP, AND THEN EACH OF THE PROCEEDING THREE
CHAPTERS ADDRESS A MAJOR PART OF THIS PUZZLE.
CHAPTER 2 DEFENDS A VIEW OF NATURAL INFORMATION AS
FACTIVE, THAT IS, ALWAYS INDICATING MATTERS OF FACT. I OBJECT TO A
RECENTLY COMMON LINE OF REASONING IN FAVOR OF A NON-FACTIVE
VIEW. I ARGUE THE REASONING COMMONLY OFFERED IN FAVOR THE NONFACTIVE APPROACH CONFLATES TWO DIFFERENT PROBLEMS TO DO WITH
INFORMATION AND INTENTIONALITY, ONE OF WHICH DOES NOT
ACTUALLY WEIGH IN FAVOR OF NON-FACTIVITY, AND THE OTHER OF
WHICH IS NOT RESOLVABLE JUST IN INFORMATION-THEORETIC TERMS. IN
iv

CHAPTER 3, I DEFEND A VIEW OF THE EXPLANATORY SENSE IN WHICH
SYSTEMS OF DYNAMIC RELATIONS “GIVE RISE TO” COGNITIVE PROCESSES.
I ILLUSTRATE THE RELEVANT FEATURES OF DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
MODELS, AND I DESCRIBE CONSTITUTIVISM – A WIDESPREAD VIEW OF THE
EXPLANATORY RELATION IN QUESTION. I ARGUE CONSTITUTIVISM DOES
NOT PROVIDE A PLAUSIBLE ACCOUNT OF LEVELS OF ORDER IN CERTAIN
DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS. CONSTITUTIVISM MAKES A COMMITMENT ABOUT
THE LOWER-ORDER COMPONENTS BEING CONTAINED BY THE HIGHERORDER PHENOMENA THEY HELP EXPLAIN, AND DYNAMICAL LOWERORDER COMPONENTS NEED NOT BE CONTAINED IN THIS WAY. I SUPPORT
AN ALTERNATIVE, GENERATIVE, DYNAMICAL VIEW OF THE EXPLANATORY
BASIS OF COGNITION. IN CHAPTER 4, I ADVANCE A VIEW OF COGNITION AS
EMBODIED. I ARGUE THAT THE EXAMINATION OF THE EXPLANATORY ROLE
OF THE BODY HAS BEEN LIMITED BY ITS FOCUS ON PERCEPTION AND
ACTION, AND THAT THE BODY DESERVES MORE THEORETICAL ATTENTION.
TOWARD THIS END, I ARTICULATE AN ORIGINAL, FORMAL NOTION OF THE
RELEVANT KIND OF BODY, DESCRIBED AS A SPECIFIC KIND OF
DYNAMICALLY GENERATED ORDER. IN SUM, I EXPAND ON THE
UNDERSTANDING OF COGNITION AS EMBODIED IN A WAY THAT CENTERS
ON THE BODY ITSELF.
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Cognition in Nature

1

Ben Baker

Preamble

Somehow there exist in nature entities that, in a proprietary way, recognize, recall,
aim for, anticipate, and imagine things. Such cognitive processes exhibit intentionality;
they are “directed at” or “about” things in a way that is characteristic of the mental
(Brentano, 1874; Jacob, 2019). Intentional relations differ starkly from the relations
described by physical and chemical sciences. They can involve motives, mistakes, and
make-believe – all at once, in fact, as in when a child pretends to read, holding the book
upside down. One is apt to wonder how or even whether the mindless, concrete realm of
these sciences and the intentional, perspectival realm of cognition can be fit into a single
image of nature. Insofar as cognitive science and neuroscience investigate the same world,
and insofar as cognitive neuroscience is an intelligible field of research, there must be some
sense in which the investigation of thinking processes coheres with the investigation of the
flesh-and-blood world we put under a microscope. This dissertation aims to contribute to
a rich tradition of philosophical work striving to make sense of the way vivid and valueladen, intentional phenomena arise naturally in the organization of certain living animal
bodies. There is a complex assortment of theories that have been commonly put toward
this end, including theories about information-processing, computation, representation,
dynamical systems, and the relationship between perception and action. This project
critically evaluates and expands on work on these topics in order to provide a view of what
cognition in nature basically involves. Specifically, this work aims to reveal an
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underappreciated, foundational role that the whole body ought to play in our theoretical
understanding of cognition.
A notion often put to fundamental work in this domain is that of information. Brains
and bodies carry information about the world outside them, and one might hope to
understand the “aboutness” of thinking partly in terms of the “aboutness” of informational
relations. Dretske (1981) offered an approach along these lines that figures significantly in
the background of many of the views I will discuss. For Dretske, information is
communicated only about matters of fact and so cannot be mistaken or misleading, yet we
know that thought processes can indeed be led astray, so it is a puzzle how the latter could
derive from the former. This puzzle is at the forefront in Chapter 2. To jump ahead to part
of the conclusion there, this puzzle is not to be solved in information-theoretic terms alone.
Finding that some neural activity, N, carries information about some fact, F, says very little,
on its own, about what sort of cognition might be occurring. Information transmission is
occurring literally all over the place and at all times, so some systematic account is needed
to describe how the relevant information is received and processed.
One option, and another aspect of the theoretical landscape in the background here,
is to analyze the relevant information-processing in terms of symbolic operations in the
brain, carried out according to a syntax inherent in the structure of our nervous systems
(Fodor, 1980, 1975, 1987; McCarthy & Hayes, 1969; Pylyshyn, 1984; Simon & Newell,
1971). On this view, there is an instructive analogy between the way the inner states of the
laptop I am writing on are meaningful with respect to my keystrokes, and the way the inner
states of my brain are meaningful with respect to the objects I am perceiving and thinking
about. (I discuss this symbolic view in more detail in Chapter 4). A major problem for this
2
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sort of approach is that there seem to be deep differences between the functional structure
of cognitive systems and the structure of any symbolic computational systems we can come
up with, and these do not seem to be differences that would be resolved in terms of bigger,
more complicated processes of symbolic computation (Dennett, 1984; Dreyfus, 1992;
Fodor, 2000; Harnad, 1990; Searle, 1980; R. Wilson, 2004). One way to put the worry is
that a symbolic, syntactic system is semantically cut off from whatever physical processes
might embody the system – the system is disembodied (Barsalou, 2008; Chemero, 2011;
Clark, 1998; Gallagher, 2005; Glenberg, 1997; Johnson, 2017; Shapiro, 2019; Varela et
al., 1991; Wheeler, 2005; M. Wilson, 2002). If this line of thinking is right, then the
computer analogy does more to delude than instruct, and we need a different framework
for thinking about cognition as part of nature.
Setting aside concerns about symbols and embodiment for a moment, consider the
idea that cognitive processes occur by way of mechanisms that use information carried by
the nervous system to achieve particular outcomes, where the functioning of the whole
mechanisms can be understood in terms of the coordinated functioning of its components
(Baumgartner & Gebharter, 2016; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Couch, 2011; Craver,
2007; Harbecke, 2015; Machamer et al., 2000). This formulation adds to the notion of
information-processing the idea of a characteristic method of achieving a certain result,
and the idea that lower-level processes together give rise to cognition. Further, this
suggestion does not require that these lower-level processes be symbolic computations. For
example, take the connectionist models, which, for a time, were defended as alternatives
to symbolic computation (Dawson, 1998; Hatfield, 1991; Smolensky, 1988), or other sorts
of neural network models (Cichy & Kaiser, 2019; Hintze et al., 2017). However exactly
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these models relate to symbolic computation, they arguably do describe informationprocessing mechanisms. I take this general idea of multi-level, information-using
mechanisms to express a widely held view of the sense in which cognition happens by way
of the brain and its interactions with its surroundings. However, neatly unpacking the idea
of “information-using mechanisms” is not straightforward. Part of my overall project here
is to reveal certain inadequacies with the understanding cognition as arising in this
mechanistic fashion, and to point a way toward a model that can better guide the future
science of cognition.
Many of the critics of a symbolic, computational view of cognition, who endeavor
to shed light on the embodiment of cognition, endorse some form of dynamical systems
modeling as a part of their approach (Beer, 1995; Chemero, 2011; Gelder & Port, 1995;
Hurley, 2001; Kelso, 1995; Kelso et al., 2013; M. Lewis, 2005; Schöner, 2008; Shapiro,
2019; Spivey, 2008; Warren, 2006). Somewhat paradoxically, a key insight of this line of
work has to do with how processes outside of the body contribute to cognition. This
presents a source of tension for thinking about cognition in terms of constitutive
mechanisms. One would probably have thought the location of cognitive mechanisms
would be largely confined to the head or body, but mechanisms are partly located wherever
their constitutive components are, which appears to extend far outside the body. Extant
literature, so far as I find, has not clearly articulated what I think is the right way to untangle
this matter. Others have either ignored the tension I just described, argued that dynamical
explanations should be given a mechanistic interpretation, or accept the conclusion that
cognitive mechanisms are broadly extended outside of what we canonically identify as a
body (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2013; Clark, 2008; Kaplan & Craver, 2011; Noë, 2005; R.
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A. Wilson, 2014). I argue for the alternative I favor in Chapter 3. I contend that we need a
non-constitutive understanding of the relationship between levels of order in dynamical
systems to make sense of embodiment, and that the notion of a generative relation, due to
Miracchi (2017), meets this theoretical need.
So, my project here broadly supports and builds on an effort to reveal the dynamic
and embodied nature of cognition. A central idea within this family of thinking is to
foreground an essential interdependence that exists between processes of perception and
processes of intentional action and, in light of this, to suggest ways of explaining how
cognitive processes arise in perceptual-motor engagement with the world (Clark, 1998;
Hurley, 2001; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Varela et al., 1991). This brings the body into our
understanding of cognition, because perceptual-motor capacities are determined by the
structure of the body. However, this sort of thesis about perception and action does not tell
us precisely what we mean by “the body” itself, and so does not explore whether that body
is relevant to understanding cognition in a way beyond its contribution to the structure of
perceptual-motor capacities. I propose, in Chapter 4, to attend to the body in a more general
sense than as a perceptual-motor machine. Drawing on basic principles from dynamical
systems modeling that will already have figured in the discussion, I articulate an
elementary account of a “Body” as a self-organizing boundary that meets certain formal
conditions. These formal conditions involve characteristic asymmetries between parts of
the system on either side of the dynamically generated boundary, and characteristic
transactions across this boundary. This Body is a theoretical construct designed to figure
in a larger view of perception, action, and cognition as embodied. My account thus means
to develop the foundations of this view of cognition’s embodied, dynamic nature – to
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extend of this line of thinking at its roots, so to speak, providing for a deeper sense of
cognition as embodied.
At the end of the dissertation, I will not have answered how specific, intentional
contents are determined by specific, brain-body-environment relations. So, for instance, if
we have competing descriptions of the information that figures in a cognitive or subcognitive process, my account does not say precisely how to settle the dispute. But I hope
that it serves to reorient the discourse so that it is headed toward a philosophically wellfounded, empirically tractable notion of how cognition arises from the brain, body, and
environment.
Here is the plan: In Chapter 2 I argue for a view of Natural Information. I refine a
Dretskean picture, wherein Natural Information is Factive, in opposition to a strand of nonFactive, probabilistic or correlational views of the information content relevant for
understanding the workings of a cognitive systems. I show how the reasoning behind the
non-Factive approaches conflates different shortcomings of a simple, Dretskean view. I
propose one problem can be addressed by relying on a more precise understanding of
natural laws and law-like invariance than Dretske did, while the other problem – the
reference class problem – is not something to be solved in terms of a theory of information.
In Chapter 3, I defend a view of the sense in which dynamic relations among brain, body,
and environment together “give rise to” cognitive processes. In other words, I account for
the relation between a higher-level phenomenon and its explanatory basis, in dynamical
models in particular. I spell out the relevant aspects of dynamical systems models, and spell
out a mechanistic, Constitutivist view of the explanatory basing relation, which I take to
be widespread. I argue that Constitutivism fails to accommodate the way lower-order
6
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components can be more global than then phenomena they give rise to, in dynamical
systems. I demonstrate this issue of locality in detail and conclude, on its basis, in favor of
understanding the explanatory relation in question as one of dynamic generation. In
Chapter 4, I advance a view of cognition as embodied in the basis sense of arising with
respect to a particular body, and toward this end I offer an original, formal notion of the
relevant kind of Body. I contextualize and motivate this account by distinguishing
important shared insights and disagreements among other approaches to the embodiment
of cognition. I argue that the examination of the explanatory role of the body has been
limited by its focus on perception and action, and work to develop deeper view of what the
embodiment of cognition involves.

7
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Natural Information, Factivity, and Nomicity

1. Introduction

Natural information is information that can be found in the observable world –
something carried by objective events or properties in the world, or relations among them.
I take it to be generally agreed that cognition is to be understood partly in terms of the way
certain systems process or pick up natural information. Natural information is to be
distinguished from information as represented mentally or linguistically, both of which
involve the kind of intentionality that natural information is invoked to help explain.
Current philosophical discourse about natural information is heavily indebted to Dretske’s
(1981) account, however it has been widely noted that his view runs into some problems.
Specifically, this account is alleged to be too strict and to face a reference class problem.
Part of Dretske’s proposal was that Natural Information is only ever carried about actual
events – about facts – and not about probability distributions among events. That is, Natural
Information is Factive. A common thought about how we ought to depart from a Dretskean
view of information is to hold that Natural Information is Non-Factive, in part as a response
to worries about the reference class problem and strictness. I argue that this approach is
misguided. I argue the move to Non-Factive information does not resolve the reference
class problem and that the objectionably strict nature of a Dretskean view can be remedied
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without giving up on Factivity. Rather, Dretske’s claim that informational relations must
be based in laws of nature is the culprit when it comes to strictness. Drawing on a more
nuanced and far-reaching understanding of “lawlike,” that is, Nomic relations as
information-bearing, I argue for a Factive and Nomic view of the kind of Natural
Information that plays an important role in perceptual and cognitive processes.
I proceed as follows: in section 2, I outline a basic, Dretskean picture of Natural
Information, which understands informational relations to be Factive and based in laws of
nature. I then describe several approaches according to which information is non-Factive,
noting that this approach is motivated partly by the observation that information-users
(whose behavior we ultimately hope to better understand) sometimes are led into error by
their information-carrying states. In section 3 I turn to take a closer look at how we can
properly understand talk of “laws of nature” and “Nomic” regularities in nature. I argue
that an appropriately nuanced understanding of Nomicity should replace Dretske’s more
blunt appeal to laws of nature as a way of distinguishing information-carrying covariance
from accidental covariance. I show that all parties to this discourse agree that such a
distinction is necessary, but others have not recognized that being more precise about
Nomicity addresses the main problem with the Dretskean account of information. In
section 4, try to show that the critical reaction toward a non-Factive notion of information
is based on a faulty line of reasoning; cases of information-users making errors do not
support the conclusion that information is non-Factive. I conclude by offering a definition
of Natural Information as both Factive and Nomic, and by clarifying how Factive
information involves uncertainty and probability.

9
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2. Dretskean Thesis and the Anti-Factivity Response

2A Factivity and Lawfulness
Dretske (1981) developes an account of how information about the environment
flows it into the brain of perceivers and knowers, aiming to provide an understanding how
perception and knowledge arise in the natural world. This notion of information expanded
on the notion of information developed by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver (1949).
The Shannon-Weaver model essentially provides mathematical means for calculating
stochastic entropy, which has deep ties to the considerably older, thermodynamic notion of
entropy. The entropy of information theory is usefully glossed as a measure of “uncertainty
reduction.” (Barwise & Seligman, 1997; Kugler & Turvey, 1987). Consider the sense in
which the result of a standard coin-flip measurably reduces uncertainty (from two
possibilities to one) in a lesser degree than the result of tossing a six-sided die does (from
six possibilities to one); this is the sense in which the Shannon-Weaver model says the
former result is less informative than the latter. Grasping the math of their model (why
information is measured logarithmically) is not important for this discussion. The
philosophical questions to do with understanding information as Natural are beyond the
scope of the Shannon-Weaver model. Since Shannon-Weaver information is purely formal,
it does not describe a kind of information that is, per se, to be found in the world and not
just in our thoughts and speech. Dretske offered a theory of information flow as a natural
phenomenon, hoping to show how it gives rise to intentionality. (Going forward I will start
to simply refer to “information” without the “natural” qualification, trusting my meaning
will be clear from context).

10
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The Dretskean view of information-carrying signals involves two important
conditions, Factivity and Lawfulness. Factivity can be concisely expressed using
Dretske’s favored term; indication. Dretske’s thinking here also parallels Grice’s (1957)
notion of “natural meaning.” A signal carrying information about F-ness indicates F-ness.
Smoke is an informational signal of fire insofar as it indicates a fire. By contrast, linguistic
utterances and conventional signs are non-Factive. The utterance “there is a fire” and a
ringing fire-alarm may not indicate a fire; the speaker of the utterance could be mistaken
or lying, and the alarm could have been triggered by a prankster or an electrical
malfunction. In such misleading cases the Dretskean view says that the utterance and alarm
do not carry information about a fire. In Dretske’s words, “false information and misinformation are not kinds of information—any more than decoy ducks and rubber ducks
are kinds of ducks” (1981, 45). Of course, we sometimes speak of false information or misinformation, as in “he informed me that there was a fire even though there wasn’t one,” but
that would be to use a non-Natural sense of “information.” The contrast between the
Factivity of information and the non-Factivity of intentional states is what sets up the
central philosophical challenge for Dretske’s information-based approach to intentionality.
He saw the puzzle as one of accounting for how a Factive, brain-world relationship could
be the basis of a non-Factive, mind-world relationship (Dretske, 1986). That puzzle is not
my focus here though – here I am just concerned with what Natural Information is. So, I
will work from the following statement of the Dretskean Thesis (DT) on information,
which slightly rewords what can be found on pages 65 and 76-77 on Dretske (1981):
DT: A signal, b’s being N, carries the information that s is F if and only if (i) the
conditional probability of s’s being F, given that b is N, is 1, and (ii) this
conditional probability relation is fixed by some law(s) of nature.

11
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Some part or process in nature, s, is a source of information, which can manifest
various states, among which one is F. For example, s might be particular part of space-time
that can either exhibit a fire, F, or a non-fire, G. The information-carrying” event, b’s being
N, is also a source of information itself, but carries information about s’s being F if
conditions (i) and (ii) are met, according to DT. For example, b might be part of space-time
that can manifest smoke, N, or non-smoke, O. More relevantly, b might be a part of the
brain that can manifest a particular pattern of neural activity N, or a different pattern O.
Figure 1

Diagram of information transmission: b’s
being N carries information about s’s
being F. Smaller, grey boxes and vertical
ellipses represent possible counterfactual
manifestations of s and b. The double-line
between s and b represents the nonaccidental relation between them;
according to DT, it represents a constraint
of some law(s) of nature. (The two sets of
possible events are also here depicted as
similarly sized and proximately connected
but that need not characterize information
transmission).

Factivity is entailed by DT’s condition (i), in the required probability of 1. If N occurs and
carries the information that s is F, then (with probability 1) s is F. Since a signal is to be construed
as one among a definite set of possibilities, it is more precise to say “b’s being N” carries
information, and somewhat misleading to say “N” (all by itself) carries information, but I will
sometimes use the less precise phrasing, for brevity. Condition (ii) in DT expresses Lawfulness.
More generally, (ii) is a version of a non-accident condition. That is, Lawfulness offers a way to
account for the idea that there are some mere coincidences; accidental correlations that are not
informative in the relevant sense. To illustrate, suppose that there is an ordinary coin that, when
tossed many times in an ordinary way, happens to land heads on every single toss. Call this coin
12
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“s,” and use “is F” for the predicate “is tossed,” call the event of this coin landing “b,” and use “is
N” for the predicate “lands heads.” In such a case there is an observable, perfect correlat ion

between the coin being tossed and the coin landing heads. This is an example of an
accidental correlation because, insofar as it involves fair coin tosses, the correlation does
not reflect the actual “fairness” of the coin – what one might call the natural disposition or
physical tendency of such a coin’s behavior. A Dretskean view holds that accidental
correlations do not reflect the information-carrying properties of events in the world. The
reference to “conditional probability” in DT is meant in the sense in which one would say
that the probability of a fair coin landing heads is .5, conditional on it being tossed in the
air, and that the probability that two entities are gravitationally drawn together is 1,
conditional on them having mass. No matter how many times a fair coin has landed heads,
there is no non-accidental relation between its being tossed and its landing heads, and so
no channel via which information is transmitted from one event to the other.
Pointing to paradigmatic examples of accidental correlations like streaks of lucky
coinflips (and so rejecting a Frequentist notion of probability), as I have just done, does
very little to characterize the correlations that do amount to informational relations. So, as
(ii) makes explicit, a Dretskean view looks to the laws of nature for this purpose. Actually,
Dretske uses different phrases to connote non-accidentalness in different places, some of
which are weaker-sounding that (ii). For instance in one place he makes this claim in terms
of “nomic dependence” (75 and 76), and he relies on an example where informational
relations are fixed by conventions among regular partners in a card game (70), which seems
not to involve “lawful” correlations in as strong a sense as DT suggests. Still, I represent a
direct appeal the “laws” in DT because he often makes such explicit appeal and because it
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serves clarity of exposition here, as it reflects what others in the discourse I join have taken
Dretske’s view to be. Admittedly, it is not self-evident what should be counted among the
laws of nature, or which conditional probabilities these laws determine, but the appeal to
laws of nature at least seems to say more than an appeal to “non-accidentalness” alone. For
example, it is prima facie plausible that some natural law(s) ensure a correlation between
smoke and fire, and that no natural law underwrites the fact that a particular coin lands
heads every time it is tossed.
It is worth briefly noting one thing Dretske says about why he invokes the laws of
nature. He claims that the important thing laws do (that accidents do not) is determine the
truth of certain counterfactuals that he claims must accompany informational relations. He
says “laws have a modal quality (they tell us what must be the case or what cannot happen)
that is absent from simple statements of exceptionless correlations.” (1981, 77, italics in
original). To sum up, according to DT there is an informational connection between b’s
being N and s’s being F when and only when the connection between these events is Factive
and is modally guaranteed by laws of nature. I now turn to some dissenting views.

2B Garden Variety Correlations
A prevailing criticism of Dretske’ account of information transmission is that it is
too strict (Eliasmith, 2005; Godfrey-Smith, 1992; Kraemer, 2015a, 2015b; Millikan, 2001;
Scarantino & Piccinini, 2010; Shea, 2007). These critics suggest that it is easy to think of
counter-examples to DT, and in fact that DT rules out exactly the sort of informational
14
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relations on which we hope to base our hypotheses about intentional content. The
informational signals most pertinent to the intelligent behavior of people and animals do
not inhere in perfect correlations underwritten by laws of nature, so goes the objection.
Millikan (2004) gave clear expression to the reasoning that underlies the popular
accounts of information that diverge from DT. She argues that, insofar as people and
animals seem to cognitively rely on informational signals, these seem not to be signals that
carry a lawfully guaranteed indication of some state of the world. She considers an example
wherein a rabbit represents that there is a predator (a fox) in its immediate environment.
This a paradigmatic case for present purposes, since all parties to the debate agree that
information as to the presence of the fox is carried by its body, transmitted through various
structures in the air – light patterns, sound waves, airborne chemicals, etc. – and eventually
transmitted to some neural activity in the rabbit, such that the rabbit can have some
intentional states about the fox. Millikan has this to say about such a case:
“[N]o natural law can require it to be a predator that causes [a rabbit’s] predator
detectors to fire. Whatever information channel she uses, it is always nomically
possible that non-predators should exist who would activate it. Suppose for the
sake of the argument (though very implausibly) that there are unbreakable natural
laws that concern the effects of foxes on rabbit sense organs. Still, there surely are
no laws that nothing else could possibly produce these same effects on rabbit sense
organs.” (2004, p. 33)

In Millikan’s view, taking N to be any state of a rabbit brain you like, it must be
possible for N to be caused in the absence of any fox, say, by something that looks, sounds,
or smells like a fox. Millikan’s basic conclusion is that DT is untenably strict because it
apparently cannot substantiate basic cases like that of a rabbit’s brain carrying information
as to the presence of foxes.
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Nicholas Shea (2007) enlists Millikan’s reasoning in arguing that it is “correlational
information” that underlies intentional content, as opposed to information as defined by
DT. Importantly, the relevant “correlations” can be imperfect ones. That is, Shea’s notion
of information is non-Factive. He makes this clear, for example, when he says “instances
of a type [] R which carries correlational information about C can be tokened even when
C does not obtain” (2007, 420). (To translate, change “R” to “b is N” and “C” to “s is F”).
So according to Shea, our rabbit’s brain-state N can carry information about a fox being
around even when, in fact, there is no fox around, provided the relevant correlation exists.
This is supposed to help explain how it is possible for the rabbit to have a (false) intentional
state whose content is that there is a fox around when there is not one. Importantly for my
later discussion, Shea’s view also includes a non-accident condition. He does not refer to
“laws of nature,” but says the relevant correlations are fixed by some “common natural
reason.” This seems to be a weaker requirement than (ii) in DT, but Shea does not offer a
detailed account of what a common natural reason is.
The main point here is that the correlations Shea refers to are not meant to be mere
frequencies, as in the earlier case of a lucky streak of coin-flips landing heads. Rather, Shea
wants to rely on “objective” probabilities, “like the 50% chance that a lump of 4.5 billion
atoms of uranium-238 will emit an alpha particle in a year” (ibid). Unfortunately, even
assuming the probabilities associated with atomic radioactivity are universal, it is much
less clear how to make sense of more relevant cases. What is the “objective probability”
that some non-fox causes an N in our rabbit’s brain? Is the relevant objective probability
determined by all the non-foxes in the universe capable of making it the case that b is N,
under all possible circumstances? That would not make sense, since such a calculation
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would not yield the information that we antecedently suppose the rabbit relies on; there are
surely an incomprehensibly large number of non-foxes with that capacity, and most of them
seem not to “commonly” or “naturally” interact with rabbit brains. However, if we are to
relativize to some non-universal domain in order to determine the relevant probability –
say, relativize to events on Earth, or in the rabbit’s local habitat, or in the habitat of its
progenitors – it raises the difficult question of why that relativization fixes the objective
probability pertinent to the rabbit’s intentional state. Shea does not endorse any particular
account of objective probability, and so his “correlational information” is not preciselydefined enough to assess whether it supports plausible conclusions about the informational
properties of states like N.
This sort of worry about the appropriate relativization or reference class is
notorious, and is going to repeatedly crop up in this discussion (Hájek, 2007; Harman,
1983; Ruth Garrett Millikan, 2007). In section 4 I will clarify the relationship between the
reference class problem and the account of information I defend here, and why we should
not look to the latter to resolve the former.

2C Probabilistic Information
Scarantino and Piccinini (2010) offer the most sustained and direct argument I have
found against Factivity, Kraemer (2015b, 2015b) also rejects condition (i) and defends an
account of probabilistic information, and Scarantino (2015) presents a detailed theory of
information as a “probabilistic difference maker.” Like Shea’s, their views are explicitly
17
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motivated by observing that information-users (like rabbits) respond to signals (like
sounds) that do not always indicate what the response is a response to (immediate danger).
On that score, Scarantino and Piccinini say “[o]rganisms do make mistakes, after all. Some
mistakes are due precisely to the reception of probabilistic information about events that
fail to obtain” (2010, 319). They distinguish “all-or-nothing” information from
“probabilistic” information, where the informational content of the latter sort is not the fact
of some event occurring, like “s is F,” but is rather the extent to which an event is more or
less probable. Kraemer similarly points to the problematic strictness of Dretske’s account
and proposes that “many natural signs carry information about the probabilities of certain
occurrences” (2015a, 145, emphasis in original). Roughly, these philosophers suggest that
our rabbit’s brain-state, N, might just carry the information that there is a fox around with
some probability, p, whether or not any fox is actually there.
Scarantino and Piccinini’s reference to probability also contains a non-accident
condition. Not just any correlation will do for probabilistic information, but only “reliable”
correlations. Further, Scarantino’s (2015) use of the term “difference maker” suggests a
requirement on informational relations that shares at least a family resemblance with
condition (ii) of DT. Exploring the “difference maker” idiom in depth is beyond the present
scope, but note that, intuitively, whether there is fire makes a difference to whether there
is smoke, whereas whether a fair coin has landed heads many times in the past does not
make a difference to whether it will land heads on a particular future toss. Like Shea,
Scarantino and Piccinini avoid appealing to laws of nature but do not precisely articulate
what distinguishes the non-accidental (reliable) correlations as such. Scarantino and
Piccinini say that reliable correlations are the sort that “information users can count on to
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hold in some range of future and counterfactual circumstances” (2010, 318), and essentially
leave it at that.
In Scarantino’s (2015) theory, an informational signal implies an incremental
change in the probability of an event, relative to a prior probability that is fixed by certain
background data. So, rather than carrying the information that there is likely (with
probability p) a fox around, a signal carries the information that it is more (or less) likely
that there is a fox around, compared to the period before the signal. This will sound a lot
like Bayesian confirmation theory to those familiar with it, because it is. Scarantino aims
to incorporate the resources of Bayesianism alongside a Shannon-inspired measure of
information. Here is his formulation (2015, 423):
Incremental Natural Information (INI): b’s being N carries information about
s’s being F, relative to background data d, if and only if p(s is F | b is N, & d) ≠ p(s
is F | d).

The vital role played by background data in INI clarifies the kind of relativization
that is obscured in Shea’s unadorned appeal to objective probability. According to INI,
what information the rabbit’s N carries depends on how the background data is spatiotemporally restricted (e.g., to Earth, or to the rabbit’s home forest, or…). Of course, how
to identify the right background data is non-trivial. Again, I leave further delving into this
reference class issue for section 4.
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2D Signalling Games
There are deep parallels between the puzzle about the intentional content of
cognitive states and one about how to determine the content of the apparently
communicative behavior of living things. Animals, plants and even bacteria manifest
behaviors that seem designed to structure the behavior of other creatures (especially
conspecifics) in various ways such as helping them find food, realize reproductive
opportunities, or avoid predators (Millikan, 1989; Maynard-Smith & Harper, 2003). These
behaviors are standardly described in both scientific and folk contexts as signals that
communicate things roughly like “food is over here,” or “I am your potential mate,” or
“danger from above.” Supposing these are communicative signals, what determines their
content? Although this content-determination puzzle is analogous in significant ways to
the one about intentionality, there are also important differences between them, so it is a
substantive question whether we need the same notion of information for both, and I will
not address that question here. Still, I think it is worth briefly discussing the notion of
information at play in this other arena, which is a non-Factive one.
Skyrms’ (2010) theory of the information content of biological signals adverts to a
game theoretic framework derived from Lewis (1969). Lewis was analyzing of the
meanings associated with actions in a “signaling game.” In a rudimentary form, such a
game involves two players, “Sender” and “Receiver,” who each get certain payoffs (or
incur costs) that depend on what the exogenous state of the world and on their actions. One
round of the game goes as follows: only Sender observes the state of the world, then Sender
chooses an action, Receiver observes Sender’s choice and then must choose an action, and
the state of the world and Receiver’s choice together determine the payoffs. Lewis’s key
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insight is that sometimes, given the right arrangement of possible actions and payoffs,
Sender’s rational (payoff-maximizing) strategy might be constrained in a way that allows
Receiver to learn something about the state of the world on the basis of Sender’s choice. It
might be to Sender’s benefit to correlate her actions with what she observes, allowing
Receiver to do better than randomly guess the state of the world (assuming the available
options and rationality of the players are common knowledge). Lewis tries to use this
framework to understand the meanings of conventional, especially linguistic signals, and
Skyrms adapts it to offer a theory of the content of communications in the biological realm
generally.
One oft-discussed example of animal communication is that of a vervet monkey
alarm calls, which differ depending on the type of predator that a monkey sees and allow
monkeys in earshot to flee to bushes or treetops or wherever is most appropriate given the
kind of predator around (Seyfarth et al., 1980). In short, vervets seem to warn each other
as to which predators are around. To simplify and describe this case as a signaling game as
per Skyrms (2010), we can suppose the range of possible states of the world is “Snake,”
“Eagle,” and “No Predator,” and that Sender – the monkey who makes the call – can take
at least three different actions (calls), and that Receiver (the monkey who hears the call)
can take at least three different actions (behavioral responses), and that each world-state is
associated with a single high-payoff option for Receiver. Without delving any further into
the details of the actions and payoffs, we can see that we might model the vervet
interactions as a game where Sender’s strategy involves correlating her calls with worldstates such that Receiver can adopt a strategy that lets him reliably make the high-payoff
choice. Such a process would presumably help vervets to survive and reproduce.
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Skyrms’ view is that biological signals like alarm calls carry information insofar as
a Receiver’s actions warrant attributing to the Receiver an (implicit) probability
assignment as to the state of the world, conditioned on the signals. Skyrms’s information
content is thus a vector of probabilities over possible states. For example, [p, q, (1-p-q)]
could be a vector describing the information in an alarm call, where p is the probability
assigned to Snake and q is the probability assigned to Eagle. Importantly, this model does
not require a perfect correlation between Sender actions and states of the world, so these
vectors standardly involve probabilities less than 1. This occurs when Sender employs a
“mixed strategy,” where she sometimes takes different actions for the same state of the
world, rendering the “message” in her action indeterminate. For instance, Sender’s strategy
might be to have a call that is highly correlated with Snake but that she occasionally uses
in the No Predator world-state, and since Receiver could know this, the relevant
information content vector would have p slightly less than 1. There are significant details
I am skipping over, but for present purposes it is enough to see that, on Skyrms’ approach,
an information signal need not indicate the state of the world that Sender, in fact, observes.
On the above approach, information content in a biological signal is determined by
the details of the game used to model the phenomenon, that is, by the specific model’s
assumptions about what actions and payoffs there are. Information is thus relativized to the
details of the game model in a way analogous to how, in Scarantino’s account, it is
relativized it to a particular set of background data. Choosing a game model to use is
analogous to choosing a reference class. Also, in specifying the players’ strategies, we
effectively stipulate the relevant modal facts, so the question of whether accidents carry
information does not immediately arise on this game theoretic approach.
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I have now illustrated several non-Factive views information, and noted how each
relies on a kind of reference class and on the exclusion of merely accidental correlations. I
now shift focus to “non-accidentalness,” to work toward the view of information I want
ultimately to defend here.

3. Non-Accidentalness as Nomicity

3A What Matters is Modality
Recall that Dretske’s appeal to laws of nature was motivated by the need to
establish relevant modal truths. Similarly, Scarantino and Piccinini (2010) expound on the
“reliability” of a correlation by adverting to what would happen in some counterfactual
cases, and Shea (2007) also suggests that “common natural reasons” underwrite relevant
counterfactuals. So, there is consensus that the important difference between accidental
and non-accidental covariance involves modal implications. Everyone here agrees, for
instance, that if smoke carries information about fire, the non-accidentalness of smoke-fire
covariance implies that if there were no smoke, there would be no fire (or at least, fire
would be less probable than previously). By contrast, the fact that a fair coin has landed
heads one hundred times in a row does not imply that, if it were tossed slightly differently
the last time, it still would have landed heads. The common assumption is that such modal
implications are required for information to be (potentially) guiding or revealing. This idea
is connoted by Dretske’s claim that information is what one can learn from a signal, and
in Scarantino and Piccinini’s claim that reliable correlations can be “counted on,” and in
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the much older idea that objective probabilities must be a “guide to life” (Butler, 1736).
The basic point seems to be this: nature is structured in a way that has modal implications,
some covariations manifest or constitute this structure and others do not, and information
only inheres in the covariations that do manifest or constitute this structure. Further, unless
information implies this modal robustness, it cannot help explain the way informationusers accurately aim at things, reliably predict things, correctly infer things, etc.
One might hope to avoid worrying about non-accidentalness altogether by
construing information directly in terms of the relevant counterfactuals, making no
reference to probabilities. Cohen and Meskin take this approach; their central claim can be
stated as follows (2006, 335):
Counterfactual Theory of Information (CTI): b’s being N carries information
about s’s being F if and only if the counterfactual “if s were not F, then b would
not be N” is non-vacuously true.

The qualification “non-vacuously” is meant to rule out information always being
carried about all necessary conditions. Without it, CTI would imply that every signal
carries the information that 2+2=4, for instance. Note that CTI is a Factive notion of
information, given that “b’s being N” and “s’s being F” are to be construed as actual events.
Further, CTI is implied by DT, given the modal implications of laws of nature. However,
CTI does not commit to laws of nature as determining the truth of the relevant
counterfactuals, as it is silent about what makes the relevant counterfactuals non-vacuously
true. This silence makes CTI unsatisfying in the present context, because the truth of
counterfactual statements does not reveal or explain the informative, “guiding” property
that informational relations are supposed to have. For example, suppose we accept that it
is non-vacuously true that if there were no fox, the relevant neural activity in the rabbit’s
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brain would be different. We have not said what in the world connects the fox event and
the rabbit-brain event such that information about the former is carried by the latter. To ask
in virtue of what these counterfactuals hold is essentially to ask about non-accidentalness,
of which CTI offers no particular view. If it turned out that, in order for a counterfactual to
be non-vacuously true it must be determined by laws of nature, then CTI would come out
approximately equivalent to DT. If not one based on laws of nature, still some notion of
non-accidentalness seems to be playing an important, implicit role.
I propose we understand non-accidentalness in terms of Nomic relations. These are
law-like invariances in the spatio-temporal ordering of nature, which are not themselves
full-fledged laws of nature. I spell this idea out further below, but to set up the discussion
of Nomicity, consider three variations of the example I call “Thermometer Information,”
below. It seems that we can make relatively uncontroversial judgments about the relevant
informational relations in these cases (stated at the end of each variant), but what we want
to know is why they are the right judgments.
Thermometer Information
(a) In a typical thermometer, a volume of mercury, V, covaries at rate C with the
temperature, T, of the surrounding space. (V carries information about T).
(b) A volume of mercury, V, covaries at rate C with the temperature, T2, of a location
on a different planet. (V does not carry information about T2).
(c) In the vacuum of space there is a volume of (quite solid) mercury, V, which does
not covary at rate C with the surrounding temperature, T3. (V does not carry
information about T3).

I take it that the covariation in (a) is non-accidental and is a typical example of
Nomic covariance. Case (b), on the other hand, is one of merely accidental covariation,
assuming there is not a very peculiar, interplanetary connection. Case (c) appears to involve
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the same kind of events that figure in (a) – there is some mercury and there is a temperature
of the surrounding space – but the covariation at rate C is missing because of the way the
internal structure of solid mercury differs from that of liquid mercury. This seems to
suggest that whatever Nomic relationships fix the covariation in (a) do not hold in (c).
However, one might have thought that the Nomic relationships governing nature and hold
everywhere, so what gives? If we can find a counterexample to a generalization, such as
“the volume of mercury exhibits covariance at rate C with the surrounding temperature,”
does that imply that the generalization is not a law of nature or Nomically guaranteed?
Note that we cannot even say that the generalization in (a) holds “usually” or “on average,”
at least not if those terms are just interpreted spatio-temporally, since it appears much more
of space-time is below mercury’s melting point than is above it. If we said “usually on
Earth” that would be another matter, but then we arrive again at the reference class
problem. Why should relativization to Earth in particular fix these putatively objective
informational relations?
To get clear about how to account for the standard conclusions on what information
is transmitted in the range of Thermometer Information cases, we need a more nuanced
understanding

of

non-accidentalness.

Theories

of

information

(as

underlying

intentionality) generally invoke non-accidentalness in the form of laws of nature, common
natural reasons, or the reliability of certain correlation, but without spelling out the details
of how this non-accidentalness operates between various kinds of events.
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3B Law-Like Invariance, Nomicity
I propose to use Woodward’s (2017) discussion of the relationship between
physical modality, laws, and counterfactuals to guide the inquiry here. A key feature of
Woodward’s account that has not been adequately appreciated in the philosophical
literature on information is the role that initial conditions play in the invariances that
scientists probe, even those often dubbed a “Laws of Nature.” Woodward suggests that
“invariance” is actually a more felicitous term than “law” to designate the non-accidental
relationships we are interested in here. This is because laws are, in general, paired with a
range of initial conditions, and only within that range does the law guarantee the invariance
in question. One could also say that a law can only be “counted on” to hold given the
requisite initial conditions. The basic point here is that a generalization does not need to be
exceptionless in order to be a law, because exceptions exist outside the range of initial
conditions corresponding to a law. Woodward helps illustrate this with the examples of,
first, General Relativity, which he notes is thought not to apply over the smallest
measurable distances due to quantum effects, and second, the strong, weak, and
electromagnetic forces, which appear, at very high energy scales, not to behave remotely
like our models of them say they will (2017, 8).
This feature of the natural laws that practicing scientists employ is obscured by an
old-school manner of articulating laws as logical schema, in particular as universally
quantified conditional statements. For example, a candidate statement of a law of nature,
using the classical philosophical formulation, would be “all smoke comes from fire,” and
another would be “if ambient temperature increases by X, the volume of nearby mercury
increases by X∙C.” Such expressions fit with a view of laws as universally applicable, and
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as having instances wherever the properties they involve are manifest. Wherever in the
universe there is smoke, the candidate law I just mentioned (if it were really a law) would
be instantiated and would guarantee that a fire is there too. Woodward makes clear that this
way of thinking about laws is deeply problematic.
Laws are typically formulated by scientists as (systems of) differential equations,
which differ from universally quantified conditionals in several important ways. A lawdescribing differential equation involves a set of interrelated variables, each of which
represent some aspect of nature, each of which can take a wide range of values while still
exhibiting the invariance specified by the equation. That is, what a law says is invariant is
the relationships among the variables specified by the equation(s), not generalizations
about entities. Such generalizations, like “smoke follows fire,” might loosely be thought
of as described by certain combinations of certain values of the variables that figure in a
law. Thus, a lawful invariance can be realized in starkly different ways, which are
represented by starkly different sets of values and functions that yield a solution to the
differential equation(s). To refer to all of these possible solutions as “instances” of the law
makes little sense because of how they range over phenomena that are so qualitatively
diverse. While it is relatively easy to group together the phenomena (instances) described
by “there is smoke and there is a fire,” it is not remotely easy to group together the
phenomena that are aptly described by the differential equations that represent lawful
relations among the strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces. In fact, exactly what
physical phenomena such differential equations describe are so abstract and distant from
everyday life that providing an illustrative example (to any non-physicists) is basically
impossible without extensive explanatory work. The main point here is that such
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differential equations only have solutions when their concomitant variables fall within a
certain range of values, that is, initial conditions.
Therefore, if there were a law concerning the relationship between the volume of
mercury and the surrounding temperature, it might specify that the two variables, V and T,
do perfectly covary at rate C, but only when they fall within certain ranges. The fact that
those ranges are exceeded in the vacuum of space would then explain why the law does
not apply in case (c) of “Thermometer Information.” However, our best scientific theories
do not posit such a specific law about the relation between mercury and temperature.
Rather, the law(s) relevant to that case involve highly general equations with variables
whose values can describe both solid and liquid mercury, and countless other substances.
The relevant laws hold both in typical households and in the vacuum of space, and so the
invariance described by the relevant differential equations subsumes both the observable
covariance in (a) and the lack thereof in (c). However, to formally represent what is
invariant across these two cases requires a level of abstraction and precision that is difficult
or impossible to achieve using everyday language (this is one reason calculus is important).
Now let us consider the fact that laws of nature do not advert to entities like
“smoke” or “mercury.” Most of the regularities that we talk about, and that inform how we
live our lives, are like the one in (a) in the following way: they are law-like insofar as they
are invariant given certain initial conditions, but compared with the invariances we call
“Laws of Nature” they are much less general (i.e., have a much narrower domain of
application) and are less theoretically relevant for the empirical study of other very broad
generalizations. The difference here is essentially a matter of degree (2017, 9):
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“Laws are those invariant generalizations whose range of invariance is sufficiently
large…and which (at least in many cases) are integrated with other laws as part of
a coherent theory. One consequence of this picture is that the boundaries of the
notion of a law become vague and there is a sort of continuum between laws and
generalizations that are…narrow enough that [they] are not regarded as laws.”

Following Woodward, I take it there is no fundamental principle that distinguishes
an invariance as a “law” from the less general invariances that are familiar everywhere
outside of basic science. (At least, no fundamental principle that does not appeal to the
practicality of certain linguistic conventions). Going forward, by “law-like invariance” I
mean to refer to all generalizations on the continuum that Woodward describes in the
quotation above. It is in these terms I propose we understand the Nomicity of information.
Recall that condition (ii) of DT required that informational relations be “fixed by
some law(s) of nature.” Among the dissents to DT that I reviewed, Millikan’s was
particularly critical of (ii), but the others also at least tacitly rejected it, avoiding the
reference to laws in favor of some weaker-sounding non-accident condition. I agree that
we should abandon condition (ii) because it rules out the cases of information transmission
we are most interested here, as there are not laws that specify correlations (perfect or
otherwise) between, for example, foxes and rabbit brain-activity. Given the preceding
discussion, I propose we adopt the following definition of Nomicity: covariation is Nomic
if and only if it realizes a law-like invariance. Since there are law-like invariances that hold
between, foxes and rabbit brain-states, requiring that informational relations are Nomic
does not force us into an unacceptably restricted view about what informational relations
exist. This reveals that the problemetic strictness of DT can be addressed by giving up
Lawfulness in favor of Nomicity. Now I want to turn back to reconsider Factivity.
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Nomic, Factive Information

4A Mistake-cases and Factivity
To briefly review, condition (i) in DT says that if b’s being N carries information
about s’s being F, the conditional probability of s’s being F, given that b is N, must be 1.
Less technically, DT says b’s being N indicates that, in fact, s is F. Recall that recent
accounts of information have rejected this condition, partly on the basis of considering
cases involving mistakes, such as a rabbit who responds to some sound as if it indicated a
predator when in fact no predator is nearby. So, the observation that information-users
make mistakes is presented as constraining our information theory in such a way that we
must posit non-Factive information. I aim to show that this reasoning on the basis of
mistake-cases is fallacious. To help illustrate my points, I rely on the following two variants
of the case of Fleeing Rabbit:
Fleeing Rabbit
(a) A pattern of air-vibration caused by a stalking fox reaches a nearby rabbit’s ears
and causes a brain state N in the rabbit. N then figures in further brain processes
that normally generate the rabbit’s fleeing behavior, and it does flee.
(b) A pattern of air-vibration caused by a fallen branch reaches a nearby rabbit’s ears
and subsequently causes a brain-state N* in the rabbit. N* then figures in the same
processes as in (a), and the rabbit flees. No predator is nearby.

Let us stipulate that the pattern of air-vibration and brain activity are
morphologically exactly similar across (a) and (b), such that the everything after the fox’s
step is indistinguishable from everything after the branch’s landing – say, indistinguishable
from the viewpoint of a well-positioned observer who has superbly high-resolution devices
for distinguishing patterns of air-vibration and rabbit brain activity. This will mean at least
that N and N* are physically constituted by the same rates of neural firing in the same
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neurons, they are proximally caused by the same pattern of energy impinging on the
rabbit’s sense organs, and their proximal effects are also the same.
Now I will reconstruct the line of reasoning that I take to be implicit in the accounts
of Shea (2007) and Scarantino and Piccinini (2010). To start, we assume N carries some
predator-related information, since we are assuming the information in N supports
ascribing predator-related intentional content to the rabbit. Now add the following premise;
N and N* must carry exactly the same information. One might think this premise is
supported by the fact that N and N* are morphologically identical and have the same
proximal causes and effects, and the fact that the rabbit presumably has the same intentional
state across (a) and (b). This is often explicitly a part of why theorists support a non-Factive
view of information; an information-carrying state like N is thought to carry probabilistic
content – something like “90% predator, 10% other” – because that way we can understand
N and N* to be information-carriers of the same basic kind. Insofar as one is convinced
that N and N* have the same relevant information content, and given that N carries
predator-related information, we can conclude that N* also carries predator-related
information even though no predator is around. Thus, the non-Factivity of information
follows.
However, the stipulated similarities between N and N* do not entail that they carry
the same information. Nothing in the discussion so far suggests that morphology and
proximal causal relations fully determine information content. All parties here agree that
covariation must be non-accidental in order to be information-transmitting, but the nonaccidental relations that N and N* stand in are not exhausted by proximal causal relations.
The critics of DT endorse non-accident conditions that are weaker than Lawfulness, and I
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contend that these critics should be happy to accept the Nomicity requirement articulated
above, as it does the job that notions of “reliability” or “common natural reason” are
supposed to do. However, understanding non-accidental covariation as tied to initial
conditions in this way undermines the argument against Factivity. We cannot, in general,
assume that N and N* carry the same information, since N and N* stand in different Nomic
relations to the rest of the world.
The event of b’s being N stands in all sorts of Nomic relations and carries all sorts
of information. It carries information about the presence of a fox, about patterns of air
movement in the rabbit’s ear, about the presence of a working rabbit brain and much more,
all specified with respect to the initial conditions of one or another Nomic regularity that
N stands in. This fits with the idea that information, understood as a natural, objective
commodity, is what a hypothetical observer can learn from a signal, where such a
hypothetical observer could have any perspective we can imagine. In other words, one
might be interested in any s that stands in some Nomic relation to b, and this s could be
described in terms of any manner of F-ness, G-ness, etc. Thus, when we talk of the
information that a state like b’s being N carries – all of the information – we are talking
about an incomprehensibly huge and diverse multitude of facts, each guaranteed by one in
a multitude of sets of initial conditions. It can be easy to lose sight of how copious the
informational structure of the world is, partly because we are so good at filtering relevant
from irrelevant information. Nomic and Factive covariation is very easy to come by, and
certainly is present between rabbit brain-states and foxes. Under some range(s) of initial
conditions, N does Nomically guarantee that a fox is nearby. This is not just a technical
matter, because it might turn out that N’s role in giving rise to a cognitive achievement like
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fleeing is not determined just by its proximal causal properties. Rather, it might be how N
figures in a complex system of dynamic relations that structures the rabbit’s fleeing
behavior, in which case N’s causal and modal relations to distal entities not present in case
(b) could be relevant a theory of what intentional content is associated with N. In the
subsequent chapters I develop a view of how such broad, dynamical relations are essential
to the understanding of cognition – a view that is ruled out by the assumption that N and
N* have the same relevant informational properties.
Recognizing the copiousness of information allows one to ask, in essence, “which
information is it,” carried by a particular pattern of brain activity, N, that is relevant for
understanding some intentional state or activity. That is, having hypothesized a role for
some information-carrying event – like a role in predator-avoidance behavior – on what
basis does one pick out the Nomic relationship and attendant initial conditions that define
the information relevant to that role? This is just to state the reference class problem in
terms of information. By assuming a certain kind of answer to this question, we can be
compelled by the idea that N and N* must carry the same (relevant) information. We come
to this judgment if we assume a reference class that roughly reflects our own epistemic
position as human observers. That is, when we look at a rabbit brain across various
contexts, N and N* look to us like the same state – we can learn the same sorts of things
from each of them. For instance, we can learn from each that the rabbit is about to exhibit
predator-avoidance behavior. But appealing to what we can tell apart brings our own
reference frame into the picture, so to speak. It smuggles our own intentionality into what
was supposed to be an account of how a brain, body, and environment interact to give rise
to intentionality via information transmission.
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So, to classify N and N* as information-carriers of the same kind requires some
justification for selecting reference classes. However, what justifies picking out a particular
class of informational relations is not something to be answered in information-theoretic
terms; something besides information theory must help us tell which information is
relevant to a particular intentional process. A common thought is that something about how
N functions in a larger process of predator avoidance determines which is the relevant
information N is carrying. Dretske (1988) developed this thought in terms of states having
a function to indicate states of the world, where functions derived from evolution and
learning, broadly speaking. Informational Teleomantics names a family of theories that try
to account for the information-carrying functions of bodily processes and communicative
behaviors by appeal to natural selection (Godfrey-Smith, 1992; Millikan, 1984, 2017;
Neander, 2017, 2018; Papineau, 1987; Shea et al., 2018). While N and N* do not have
identical informational properties, they might both have the function to indicate (carry
Factive information about) the presence of a predator. It could be that N* has the function
of carrying information about a predator even though no predator is around, because N* is
failing to achieve its function – it figures in a malfunctional process.
Allow me to briefly recapitulate. The rabbit’s avoidance behavior is similar across
(a) and (b), and N and N* are assumed to play a similar role in those behaviors. If this
similarity in behavior is to be accounted for by the similarity of information between N and
N*, non-Factivity of information follows. But N and N* do not have identical informational
properties. Once we grant that function is needed to determine which informational
relations are relevant to the behavior, we can appeal to the similarity in function rather than
a similarity in informational properties to explain the similarity in behavior across (a) and

35

Cognition in Nature

2. Information

Ben Baker

(b). In other words, once we have helped ourselves to a notion of information-carrying
functions or ways of using information, we can describe mistake cases like (b) in terms of
misfunctioning or misuse of information. There is thus no need to think the rabbit’s mistake
means its brain is carrying information as to a probable predator when, in fact, there is
none. Instead we can suppose, roughly, that a rabbit’s perceptual-motor system is using N*
as if it carried information about a predator, even though it does not.
It is a controversial philosophical matter just what determines the function of part
of an organism, but it is beside the point here whether the a notion of selected functions to
carry information can stand up to scrutiny. If not by appeal to functions, something other
than information theory must support a hypothesis about which information figures in an
explanation of some perceptual or cognitive process. And going in for non-Factive
information does not bring us closer to resolving the reference class problem. In fact, it
seems the reference class (or background data, in the terms of INI, above) must be more
specific for non-Factive information; not only must we distinguish predator-related
information from irrelevant information also carried by N, say about the shape of the fox’s
foot, we must also account for the particular probabilities that figure in the relevant
information content – say “90% predator” rather than “95% predator.” In any event, some
theoretical resource outside of information theory is doing important work in the picture of
information transmission as it figures in Fleeing Rabbit. Whatever this theoretical resource
is, it can allow us to make sense of the similarity between Fleeing Rabbit (a) and (b) without
holding that N and N* must carry the same information. Thus, we should not be moved to
endorse a non-Factive notion of information based on the observation that animals
sometimes make mistakes.
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4B Nomic, Factive Information
One can maintain that processes of perception and cognition importantly depend
on information flows within a nervous system and environment, and yet acknowledge that
it is a substantive question which information flows are relevant in that regard. This is to
acknowledge that the reference class problem cannot be resolved just with the tools of
information theory. Having done this, and also recognizing the extreme heterogeneity of
Nomic regularities (given initial conditions), we can understand information, as carried
between natural events, as Nomic and Factive. Here is how we can define Nomic, Factive
Information (NFI):
NFI: Given the event of b being N, this event carries the information that s is F if
and only if (i) s is F, and (ii) this covariation between b’s being N and s’s being F
is Nomic.

NFI is similar to DT, but it is distinct in two important ways. First, it incorporates
the above notion of Nomicity based on Woodward’s (2017) view of laws and law-like
invariance. Second, NFI makes no explicit reference to probability. The requirement of
Factivity entailed by DT’s condition (i) can be readily expressed without mentioning
probability, as I have done in NFI’s condition (i). I suspect that Dretske’s appeal to
conditional probabilities (of 1) has been a source of confusion in this discourse, in part
because it suggests that the most straightforward way to address DT’s problematic
strictness is to lower the required probability in (i) to something less than 1, when, as I
argued, Lawfulness is really the source of the problematic strictness.
Because NFI makes no explicit reference to probabilities, one might worry that this
notion of information has nothing to do with probability or uncertainty. That would be an
incongruous result given the roots of thinking about information in this way. However, NFI
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is still connected to uncertainty in that the measure of information carried by an event
depends on what happens in counterfactual scenarios where the event does not occur. That
is, given that N carries information that s is F, the amount of this information depends on
what other ways b might have manifested (as O, P, etc.) and how likely it is that s would
have been F (rather than G, H, etc.) in those counterfactual scenarios. If s’s being F is quite
common across all possible states of b, then b’s being N does not carry much information
about s’s being F. By contrast, if s is rarely F except when b is N, then that signal carries
much more information – it removes uncertainty to a greater extent. Recall that the
counterfactual manifestations of s and b are literally part of the picture of information
transmission in Figure 1 (p.12). For information transmission to be measurable, F, G, H,
etc. must have determinate probabilities that sum to 1. Probabilities are a part of Nomic,
Factive information, not in the information’s content but in its measure.
Having some measure of the strength of an informational relation is essetial. For
one, the amount of information a signal carries in related to what one can do with that
information. Some reasons to endorse or abandon the hypothesis that N functions to carry
the information about a nearby predator will pertain to how much information about a
nearby predator N carries, how much it communicates elsewhere in the brain, and how this
measure of information compares to the strength of other signals of the predator. I have not
focused here on a formulation for quantifying information, but requiring that information
be Factive and Nomic does allow for measuring different amounts of information
transmitted depending on the Nomic regularity in question. For example, given a certain
reference class restricted to the rabbit’s environment (however defined), N would plausibly
both carry the information that a predator is nearby and the that a mammal is nearby, but
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carry more information as to a nearby predator, that being the more ulikely of the two
events. So, even though NFI does not mention probabilities, this is still a notion of
information that is fundamentally tied to the idea that events reduce uncertainty about
various the state of the world, in varying degrees. By properly appreciating how manifold
are the law-like, modally robust relations between actually existing parts of nature, and by
also acknowledging that accounting for intentionality requires resources outside of
information theory, we can recognize that Nomic, Factive information is perfectly adequate
for helping us understand how intentional content might arise.

Conclusion
My main goal has been to highlight a misstep in a common line of thinking of information
as non-Factive. The prevailing critical responses to Dretske’s (1981) theory conflate the
problematic strictness of this account with the fact that it does not explain how information-users
sometimes make mistakes. In the hopes of solving that latter problem with information theory
alone, the misstep relies on a false assumption that certain (brain-local) states must have the same
informational properties across similar instances of behavior, though the behavior is appropriate in
some cases and mistaken in others. Lacking a precise understanding of non-accidentalness, recent
discourse on Natural Information has failed to appreciate how a careful understanding of Nomicity
makes Factive and Nomic information broad enough to avoid the strictness of DT. I have tried to
show how Natural Information – the kind of thing that perceivers and cognizers generally depend
on their brains to process in order to engage intentionally with their world – should be understood
as Factive and Nomic.
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Dynamic, Generative Bases of Cognition

1. Introduction

Much of our scientific interest in brains and neural networks aims to improve our
understanding of cognitive activity. What is this supposed explanatory relation between
the neural and the cognitive? In what sense are cognitive processes “based” in neural and
other processes in the brain, body, and environment? Stepping back to relate this question
to other pieces of the larger philosophical puzzle here, keep in mind that cognitive
processes are described in intentional terms. Seeing, believing, wanting, imagining, and
other activities associated with cognition are activities about external objects and
possibilities. By contrast, interactions among neurons are described in a physical or formal
way – in a vocabulary that is removed from what cognition is about. My broad goal in this
chapter is to defend a view of the sense in which we can understand cognition as based in
lower-level processes.
More specifically, I offer a view of cognition as generated by dynamic relationships
between the brain, body, and environment. A goal of the larger project here, in the
background of this chapter and the foreground of the next, is refining and supporting a
view of cognition as embodied. Part of that larger view involves drawing on principles
from dynamical systems modeling to understand the lower-order relationships in terms of
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which to try to better understand cognition. How to characterize the explanatory
relationship between lower- and higher-levels in such systems is not straightforward, and
this complicates the more general controversy about the explanatory relationship we take
there to be between the neural and cognitive. Getting clear about this issue, I argue,
involves displacing a common view of the explanatory relation in question. Constitutivism
is the view that lower-order processes are explanatorily relevant to a higher-level, cognitive
phenomenon insofar as they are constituent parts of it. I argue against this view on the
grounds that higher-order phenomena in dynamical systems can be more local than their
lower-order components are. I support an alternative – Generativism – for characterizing
the sense in which cognition is based in the dynamics of brain, body, and environment. I
proceed as follows:
In section 2, I describe the basic aspects of dynamical systems models relevant to
this inquiry, and the major lines of thought that suggest they are ca serve our understanding
of cognition. In section 3, I articulate and defend a view of cognitive processes being
dynamically and generatively based in lower-level processes. I do this by considering some
basic features of different kinds of explanation, describing Constitutivism as a candidate
kind of explanation, then arguing against Constitutivism and for Generativism based on
what I show about dynamical systems. In short, I argue that lower-order dynamics can give
rise to entities that they are not contained in, so this “giving rise” must be seen as a matter
of generation rather than constitution. In section 4, I illustrate my main points in more detail
by revealing their application in a formal, dynamical model of a simple animal behavior.
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2. Dynamic Levels of Order

2A Dynamical Systems Models: What?
What is important to know about dynamical systems for the purpose of modeling
cognitive phenomena? I want to keep this discussion fairly compact and non-technical,
thus I will overlook certain ways that dynamical systems models can vary from the kind I
describe here. Readers familiar with dynamical systems models will find parts of this
section elementary – I ask for your patience as I set up the discussion of what is involved
in a dynamical systems-based explanation of cognitive processes. For readers who would
like a more detailed overview of dynamical systems models as applicable to the domain of
intelligent behavior, I point to the following sources: (Gelder & Port, 1995; Jirsa & Kelso,
2004; Kelso, 1995).
A basic feature of dynamical systems models is that the systems they model are
inherently undergoing a process of change. Elements in these models are typically
functions of time and of each other. At any given point in time, the activity of each element
is shaping and being shaped by the other elements to which one is dynamically related. The
system is understood in terms of the character of its constantly shifting from one state to
the next – modeling the system means representing how it changes from moment to
moment. By default there is no pre-stimulus state or inactive mode for such a system. The
dynamical system does not await some input before moving or, alternatively, one could
say that its current state is also its input.
Insofar as dynamic interrelations among all parts of the system structure its process
of change, the causal contributions of any of its parts are global. That is, the impact of one
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part of the system is not, in general, isolated to some local region of it, but rather is
potentially implicated in every aspect of the overall change to the system; any part of such
a system may constrain and be constrained by the entire remainder of the system. I will
look more closely at the globality or locality of the components of dynamical systems later
in the discussion. To briefly illustrate by contrast, we would not treat something as a
dynamic system if describing how the system changes is done separately from describing
the state of the system at a time. In that case the system’s global state would not be
essentially bound up with how it transitions into the next state. A minimal example of such
a non-dynamic system is a logic gate, whose “activity” occurs only under a discrete input
condition, and whose rules of behavior are specified in a abstract list of input-output
relations. Nothing interesting happens to a logic gate over time.
A more nearby case worth briefly discussing is Conway’s Game of Life and other
cellular automata (Gardner, 1970; Izhikevich et al., 2015). The relevant system in the Game
of Life is a grid of pixels, and its global state is constituted by the combination of the “on”
or “off” states of all off the pixels. The system transitions from one state to the next as
pixels blink on or off at each timestep, and each pixel’s change (or non-change) happens
according to a function of how many pixels immediately around them are “on.” The Game
of Life is a dynamical model in that the system’s occurrent state determines a distinct
temporal evolution of the system. Also, the Game of Life has the interesting property of
many dynamical systems of being able to manifest higher-level entities as patterns in the
collective interactions governed by the lower-level (pixel-level) interactions of the system.
Given the right initial conditions, “Blinkers” and “Gliders” and other macroscopic pixelstructures can persist and interact over long sequences of time (ibid.). These are basically
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cyclical patterns among pixels within a certain area, which just derive from how the stateto-state transition rules play out over multiple timesteps.
An important respect in which cellular automata standardly differ from some
dynamical systems is that the causal contributions of each of the parts (pixels) of the system
are local, rather than global. How each pixel changes is fully determined by the states of
neighboring pixels, and changes further away in the system make no difference to the
activity of the individual part, at a time. Correspondingly, the individual pixel does not, at
a given moment, make a difference to the behavior of disparate parts of the system, but just
to the behavior of neighboring pixels, and so a transition in one part of the system can be
fully predicted and described without reference to all parts of the system. I will be focusing
here on systems whose lower-level parts contribute in a global way, so I describe cellular
automata as a way of bringing out, by contrast, the kind of globality exhibited by
components of the systems I will discuss below. Systems with globally contributing lowerorder parts are of special relevance because, as I will show, they pose a problem for a
common, Constitutivist view of the sense in which higher-order entities depend on them.
The state-space of a dynamical system is basically the space of all of its possible
configurations, which encompasses all the initial conditions in which we might find the
system. More technically, one can depict the state-space as a vector space, where each
vector includes every aspect of the system’s position and the rates of change of those
aspects (and possibly rates of change of those rates of change…etc., for higher-thansecond-order dynamical systems). For example, for certain purposes one could effectively
depict a basketball’s state-space with a six-dimensional vector, three for its X, Y, and Z
position, three more the rates of change of those positions, i.e., velocity in each direction.
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Because the values for rates of change are included in this vector, it encodes the ball’s
instantaneous direction of movement along all of its dimensions, thus the system’s state
determines a unique evolution or trajectory of the system’s state over time. One could
complicate this, for instance, by adding stochastic rates of change, or by allowing that the
system is not closed and receives exogenous influences on its states, or by depicting the
dynamic relationships themselves as functions of time. There is no need to explore these
complications here though. The point is that describing a dynamical system is standardly
done by representing the space of all of these trajectory-determining points, and thereby
representing the possible ways the system can evolve over time.
In addition to letting one project the system’s possible trajectories from any given
initial state, having this state-space description often supports the identification of
interesting higher-level features of the systems behavior, in terms of some pattern or order
in the state-space, or in the trajectories through it. These are typically called “order
parameters” or “collective variables.” A higher-level feature is not just a particular
collection of vectors or trajectories, but rather it is some recognizable heterogeneity or
partition in these trajectories, sometimes called a feature of the “phase flow.” A higherlevel feature is higher-order with respect to the relatively lower-order variables that make
up the dimensions of state-space itself, which are typically called “control parameters.”
Some of the simplest and most vivid examples of such higher-order features can be found
in the realm of harmonics and standing waves; the Chladni plate experiment offers a
perspicuous demonstration and can easily be found online. In this domain, typically an
important control parameter is the frequency of some cyclical motion (oscillation), and
certain changes in frequency are associated with changes in the order of the whole system.

45

Cognition in Nature

3. Explanation

Ben Baker

I want to briefly highlight an example of a common, higher-order feature of
dynamic systems that I will refer back to later – an attractor. An attractor is, roughly, a
place in the state-space toward which the system’s state trends from a wide range of initial
conditions. Probably the most familiar example of this is gravitational attraction. Consider
a system of two massive bodies in outer space. The varying parameters that make up state
of this system – including the twelve dimensions of locations and velocities for both bodies
– are dynamically interrelated such that, under a broad range of initial conditions, the
system reliably comes to fall within a particular part of its state-space. The attractor might
be represented by a point or volume of the state space (depending on the dimensions in
which the state-space is represented). In the two-body, gravitational system, an attractor is
constituted by the set of points in state-space that represent the two bodies having collided.
An attractor also determines a “basin of attraction;” part of the state-space outside of the
attractor, from within which all trajectories lead into the attractor. At an attractor, the
system’s dynamics work to keep the system there, so there are no trajectories leading out
of it. In this sense the attractor represents a stable part of the state-space. However, this
stability does not imply stillness. The system might be drawn to a self-sustaining pattern
of activity, sometimes called a “limit cycle,” where it undergoes a regular pattern of
change. This is exemplified by the fact that, under the right conditions, rather than being
drawn into an attractor where the two massive bodies come into contact, they might get
stuck orbiting one another, continually and cyclically shaping each other’s motion. To
emphasize the main point, an attractor is higher-order with respect to the system’s control
parameters and trajectories through the state-space. The attractor is a qualitative feature of
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all the ways the system can move through the state-space; it serves as a basis for classifying
whole families of states and trajectories of the system.
Mathematically, dynamical systems are most standardly described by differential
equations (sometimes multiple at once). Parameters representing different parts or aspects
of the system figure as the variables and expressions in the equations. These parameters
are typically functions of one another, or of one another’s time derivatives, or their
derivative’s derivatives, etc. This is illustrated by the way velocities and distances are
interrelated in gravitational systems. For instance, the faster a satellite is moving parallel
to the edge of earth, the faster it must also be falling toward earth (and vice versa) in order
to maintain its orbital distance. Thus, the differential equations describing such a satellite
system would specify this relationship between rates of change. More generally such
differential equations, if they accurately describe the target system, present a formalism
specifying the states that the system can possibly occupy as it evolves from each state. That
is, these equations determine a state-space. Aside from differential equations, dynamic
systems can also be described by directed graphs, especially cyclic graphs (Hintze et al.,
2017; Koller & Friedman, 2009). These kinds of models all effectively describe a space of
possible, state-to-state changes the system can undergo, and they determine the course of
such changes or “updates” that ensue from any given starting condition.
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Figure 2
Representations of the movement of a pendulum over time. (a) Visual schematic

(b) Differential equation: θ for the angle from vertical of the pendulum arm, γ for
the friction constant, and ω for the natural frequency (c) Plot of velocity versus
time (d) Temporal trajectory through state-space. Illustrates fixed-point attractor
where velocity and position are zero. (Image from Hasse & Bekker, 2016).

2B. Dynamical Systems: Why?
Dynamical systems models are used to improve our understanding of the
macroscopic behaviors of the target system in various ways. Often the impetus for coming
up with dynamic systems model is the observation of some high-level behavior. One hopes
to better understand that behavior and the system itself by identifying the lower-order,
dynamic relationships in virtue of which the behavior arises. Also, we might look for the
lower-order dynamics that underlie causal and predictive relationships we find at the
higher-level in order to refine our grasp of those relationships. If we are seeking a more
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thorough understanding of a causal relationship between Ps and Qs, coming up with a
model of the lower-level dynamics underlying that causal relation could allow us to furnish
new, testable hypotheses about the exact conditions under which Ps do and do not cause
Qs. Dynamical systems models also provide a framework for intuitively comparing the
high-level behaviors of diverse complex systems, especially if tools are available to
represent many trajectories through state-space at once (to represent the “phase flow”). For
example, a solar system and a system of marbles on a suspended, elastic surface can exhibit
similar attractor dynamics, which can be visualized as a similar clustering of the trajectories
of the system. Higher-level features and the way they arise from lower-level dynamics is a
central part of what is interesting and useful about dynamic systems modeling.
This is an active and growing area of research; there are many philosophers,
cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and engineers proposing why and how we should use
the language of dynamical systems to understand intelligent behavior (Beer, 1995; Gelder
& Port, 1995; Kelso, 1995; M. Lewis, 2005; Rockwell, 2005; Schöner, 2008; Spivey, 2008;
Warren, 2006), and accounting for particular capacities using specific dynamical models
(Braud et al., 2018; Frank et al., 2015). A general idea behind these approaches is that
dynamic relations among sensory, motor, and environmental components give rise to
higher-order, cognitive behavior. This idea is made especially compelling in the domain of
activities that mainly involve controlled movement of one’s body, where the relevant
dynamics can be clearly described and observed. In these cases, initial conditions vary
continuously and there are complex but measurable dynamic relationships between limbs,
sensory organs, the structure of how they change, and the structure of the environment.
With the right access to the brain, data about these dynamics can be usefully compared to

49

Cognition in Nature

3. Explanation

Ben Baker

patterns in an organism’s neural dynamics. For a classic example, the influential HakenKelso-Bunz dynamical model is used to describe, inter alia, rhythmically patterned finger
movements (Haken et al., 1985; Kelso, 2008). More recently, Krishna Shenoy et al., (2013)
offers a theory of controlled arm movement arising from neural, dynamic “pattern
generators.” A related idea is that the brain ubiquitously employs “predictive coding”
schemes, continuously working to minimize a mismatch between predicted experience and
actual experience (Clark, 2016; K. Friston, 2010; Gładziejewski, 2016; Hohwy, 2013). This
idea does not strictly require a dynamic systems-based approach, but it is well suited to one
with dynamic relations between what is predicted and what is experienced, as some of its
proponents have recognized. Moving from the biological toward the engineering realm, the
idea that intelligent, autonomously controlled behavior could rely crucially on feedback
relationships giving rise to stable behaviors over time goes back at least to W. Ross Ashby,
whose famous, “Homeostat” machine achieved the behavioral “goal” of minimizing its
interactions with its environment (Ashby, 1953). More recently, some AI and robotics
researchers have used a dynamic systems approach to model and test minimally cognitive
or proto-cognitive agents (R. Beer, 1995; R. D. Beer & Williams, 2015), agent behavior in
forced-choice tasks (Bogacz et al., 2006), and task prioritization by locomotor robots
(Reverdy & Koditschek, 2018).
In short, there are numerous promising routes to understanding cognitive
phenomena in terms of dynamical systems models. Specifically, there are numerous lines
of support for the following, broad thesis, which I call “Dynamical Basis:”
Dynamical Basis: Cognitive processes are based in dynamic relationships
spanning brain, body, and environment, in the sense that higher-order features of
dynamical systems are based in the lower-order components of such systems.
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I have tried to word this thesis in a way that does not obscure the distinction between
the elements that populate a dynamical systems model, like parameter values and attractors,
and the parts of the natural world that are dynamically interrelated in ways that our models
aim to describe, like patterns of impinging physical energy and neural activity. Dynamical
Basis is a quite general idea and thus leaves some large questions unanswered. For one,
Dynamical Basis might be interpreted either as a claim about some cognitive processes, or
about all cognitive processes. Is the point to understand cognition per se as arising
dynamically, or just certain cognitive activities? I leave this question aside here, as the
weaker, “some cognitive processes” version of the hypothesis is enough to warrant the
present investigation. Dynamical Basis also invites one to ask what kind dynamic relations
give rise to a cognitive system. Complex systems can exhibit all sorts of patterns, and if
Dynamical Basis is right then we should hope to be able to specify what sorts of patterns
in what sorts of systems serve to model cognitive processes. This question is beyond my
current scope, but I will try to make some initial progress on it in the next chapter. For now,
bearing in mind the kind of systems I have described here, I turn to investigate what it
means to say that lower-level components are explanatory bases of higher-level, cognitive
processes.
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3. Generation vs. Constitution

3A Constitutivism
I started this chapter by wondering about the sense in which cognitive processes
can be understood as higher-level processes that arise from or are “based” in lower-level
processes. The idea that it is important to distinguish between levels of analysis in complex,
functional systems has been prominent for a long time (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Cummins,
1975; Darden & Maull, 1977; Marr, 1982). However there is not broad agreement about
how we ought to understand the relevant relationship between these levels. I aim to
challenge a common way of thinking about this relationship as a constitutive relation and
advance an alternative, generative understanding of the relationship. I illuminate the reason
to adopt this alternative by appeal to what I have said about levels of order in dynamical
systems. First though, I will outline some key features of this explanatory “basis” relation
in terms of the kind of explanatory role it is supposed to play.
One question we can ask about cognition is “what is it?” That question calls for an
identity relation, which does not involve a distinction between a lower- and higher-level.
To state an identity of a cognitive process is to re-describe that process itself – at its own
level, so to speak – rather than describing something that the cognitive process depends on
but is different from. I take it that cognitive neuroscience mostly tries to discover processes
that are relevant to cognition but whose properties fundamentally differ from the features
of cognitive processes per se. Cognitive processes have properties like being about things
(even potentially non-existent things), being rational (or irrational), and being something
attributable to an agent, whereas neural processes do not appear to have such properties.
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Thus, the explanatory relation between cognition and whatever its lower-level components
are is not one of identity.
Another question we can ask about some cognitive activity is “what causes it?”
That question is standardly answered by reference to something that occurs before the
relevant cognitive activity. Also, causal relations do not imply any significant distinction
in spatio-temporal scale. A causal explanation of my visualizing my sister, for example,
might just be that someone in earshot said her name. A causal explanation of my cognitive
activity could describe neural activity, for instance, in a case where my sister-visualizing
activity were elicited via electrodes applied to my brain. However, in general, our
investigation of the brain is not aimed at uncovering what causes cognition, because it is
aimed at uncovering something that stands in a synchronic explanatory relation to it. My
line of inquiry here is premised on this thought that cognition is based in brain activity that
occurs at the same time the cognition occurs.
We can also ask, of some cognitive activity, “how does it occur?” This question
does seem to invite an answer in terms of the coordinated interactions of various processes
occurring during and described at a finer grain than the cognitive activity itself. For
instance, were we to ask how it is that I am able to visualize my sister, one would expect a
plausible answer to appeal to various neural or computational processes that occur while I
am thinking of her. My visualizing evidently happens by way of certain neural processes
(in part). So, another way of stating the relevant sense in which a higher-level phenomenon
like cognition can arise out of lower-level phenomena like neural activity is to say that
what one’s brain does (in part) answers how cognition occurs. In what precise terms should
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we understand this idea of the lower-level being an answer to a ‘how’ question? What clear
examples of this interlevel explanation are there outside of the neural-cognitive domain?
At this point a short examination of the term “emergence” is in order, to clarify
what connection there is between the views I am investigating and claims that the mind
emerges from a continuous interaction between a body and its world. The term
“emergence” appears to be used in a stronger and a weaker sense, although there is some
disagreement even about these two meanings (Chalmers, 2006; J. Wilson, 2015; Winning
& Bechtel, 2019). I take it that a strongly emergent phenomenon cannot be understood in
terms of the coordinated activities of its lower-level basis. The only hope of relating a
strongly emergent phenomenon to the domain of entities it emerges from, if there is any
hope, is in terms of laws outside of any of the physical sciences – laws specifying the
conditions for emergence in systems described by physical laws. An attractor in the statespace of a dynamical system, for example, is not a strongly emergent phenomenon, because
it is understood in terms of (complex relations among) the lower-order components of the
system. Strong emergence is not relevant here, because we are considering a basis for
explanation that is, by definition, not achievable in the case of strongly emergent
phenomena.
Weak emergence, I take it, is marked by unexpectedness. We find weakly emergent
phenomena in a system when it exhibits patterned behaviors that surprise us even though
we know everything that is happening in the system at a fine level of grain. Thus, weak
emergence characterizes certain high-level entities with respect to us as observers, rather
than characterizing the sense in which a higher-level entity arises from or is explained by
its lower-level components. An attractor is only an example of a weakly emergent
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phenomenon if it is not apparent from the description of the system’s lower-order dynamics
that it exhibits that attractor. Even though the lower-order description, if accurate, entails
that the system exhibits whatever attractors it exhibits, these attractors may be entirely
unrecognizable in that lower-order description. Thus, a new, “higher” (more abstract) level
of description is introduced to represent the attractor and any relations it might stand in to
other higher-order entities. But again, whether such a higher-order entity is weakly
emergent depends on whether we could tell the system would exhibit that feature just from
the lower order description. This means not all higher-order features of dynamical systems
are weakly emergent. For example, the moon’s orbit, because it is intuitive and familiar, is
not normally considered a weakly emergent phenomenon.
As with strong emergence, weak emergence seems to connote the absence of
explanation or understanding; to the extent that some higher-level feature is well
understood in terms of a complex interaction among lower-order processes, it appears less
deserving of the label “emergent.” Admittedly, the term is sometimes used in an even
weaker sense – one that applies to well-understood phenomena just so long as they are
higher-order in some respect. In this, weakest sense, “emergent from” seems to say no more
than “based in,” in which case the term does not shed light on the relation in question – it
just changes the question to that of asking what is distinctive about the “emergence” of
cognition. What I mean to investigate here is the kind of explanatory relation that exists
when we do gain some understanding about how a higher-level entity arises from lowerlevel processes – the kind of relation that we lack in the paradigm cases of emergent
phenomena.
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The hope is that there is a workable account that is less vague than explanatory
“explanatory basis,” that applies consistently across differing examples of higher-level
features and that plausibly extends to what is going on in cognitive and neuro-physiological
systems. A leading view of this explanatory relation is Constitutivism, which I state as
follows:
Constitutivism: Lower-level processes partly explain a cognitive process insofar
as they are constituents of it; when properly coordinated, lower-level processes
jointly constitute higher-level, cognitive phenomena.

This view is supported by philosophers who propose to analyze cognitive activities
and other interesting objects of scientific observation as multi-level mechanisms, who are
thus occasionally branded “New Mechanists” (Baumgartner & Gebharter, 2016; Bechtel
& Abrahamsen 2005; Couch, 2011; Craver, 2001, 2007; Harbecke, 2015; Machamer et al.,
2000). A mechanism is essentially comprised of parts, where the organized activities of
these parts serves to explain the activity of the whole in the sense that they constitute it. To
elaborate this framework in the context of a simple example, consider a knife as a
mechanism for cutting things. One thing worth highlighting immediately is that what we
are explaining is an activity, role, or capacity (of cutting), not the knife considered as a
bounded physical object (“activity” and “capacity” are more or less interchangeable for the
purposes of this discussion). To illustrate, if one were to crumple the knife into a ball and
throw it into the sea, while there may be a coherent sense in which the “same physical
object” as the original knife would be sinking into the ocean, the knife-qua-cuttingmechanism would have ceased to exist. (There is surely more that needs to be said about
the boundary conditions of mechanisms, but not here). To this effect, Craver says “[t]here
are no mechanisms simpliciter. There are only mechanisms of behaviors” (2007, p 11).
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What we want is an explanation of these behaviors by appeal to lower-level processes, and
this approach says to understand these lower-level processes as constituents.
So, continuing with the example, we might describe the knife as constituted by two
components, a blade and a handle. Like the knife itself, these components are identified by
what they do to contribute to the knife’s cutting, not by their physical state or morphology.
Let us suppose it is the blade’s “being sharp” and the handle’s “being holdable” that, when
combined in the proper way, constitute the knife’s capacity to cut. Of course, other
conditions external to this mechanism are required for it to manifest the activity of cutting
– in particular, someone needs to wield the knife – but under those conditions, the higherlevel activity of “cutting” is constituted by the blade and handle together doing what they
do. What we might learn about knives or cutting from this multi-level analysis is perhaps
unclear, but the purpose here is just to reveal the generality of the Constitutivist framework.
The example shows that mechanisms and their constitutive parts are ubiquitous. The
capacities we are most interested in explaining surely involve many more components
interacting in much more complex ways, but the basic notion of constitution applicable in
the knife case is supposed to serve our understanding of those more interesting capacities.
To define this idea somewhat more formally, let us label an arbitrary mechanism
M, its to-be-explained, higher-level activity A, its lower-level components P1, P2, …Pn with
Pi standing for an individual component, and the activities of these components are B1, B2,
…Bn with Bi standing for Pi’s activity (see Figure 3). The Constituvist holds in general that
M’s A-ing is partly Constitutively explained by Pi’s Bi-ing, and wholly Constitutively
explained by the coordinated activities B1, B2, …Bn of components P1, P2, …Pn. In the
simple example above, the knife’s (M’s) cutting (A-ing) occurs in virtue of the blade’s
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(P1’s) being sharp (B1) and the handle’s (P2’s) being holdable (B2). The thesis at issue, for
which I will raise trouble below, is that cognition is to be understood analogously in terms
of cognitive mechanisms constituted by lower-level components.

Figure 3
Diagram of Constitutivism. Large
arrows represent the causal
preconditions and effects of M’s
A-ing. Double-bar between P1 and
P2 represents an ordered, causal
relation, which could be complex
and feedback-involving. Vertical,
dashed arrows represent the
constitutive relation. These
vertical arrows also signify
physical locality, as if space-time
proceeds left to right.

Note that the component activities are not merely aggregated but ordered so as to
constitute the higher-level A-ing. Thus, it is possible for B1, B2, …Bn to occur out of order,
in which case they do not constitute A-ing and so no A-ing occurs (assuming the containing
system does not have a redundant mechanism for A-ing). You might have a sharp blade
and a holdable handle – so P1 is B1-ing and P2 is B2-ing – but the handle is not affixed to
the blade or is affixed in some strange way such that the would-be-knife is not actually
usable for cutting. In order to Constitutively explain a mechanism, it is not enough to just
list its components, rather one must also specify the relations those components must stand
in so as to constitute the mechanism. This necessary ordering means that the components’
contributions to the higher-level activity are dependent on one another – whether one
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component does its part to help constitute the whole is bound up with whether the others
do. Thus, the higher-level activity cannot be identified with a particular set of lower-level
activities, and in this sense stands apart from them. This goes along with the idea that
cognitive processes are multiply realizable – multiply constitutable, on this view. That is,
A-ing can occur by way of different Pi’s Bi-ing, and also, the same component processes
B1, B2, …Bn might have multiple orderings that can constitute the same A-ing. Like a
knife’s cutting, the thought is, a cognitive mechanism’s doing whatever it does can be made
of somewhat different parts organized in somewhat different ways. All this is to attest to
something important Constitutivism achieves; it specifies a sense in which cognition could
be distinct or sui generis – really a “higher level” phenomenon than neural processes, even
though it does depend on those neural processes.

3B. Against Constitutivism, For Generativism
A critical feature of the relationship between a mechanism and its constitutional
components is that those component processes occur within the spatio-temporal boundaries
of the higher-level processes they constitute. One way to put this is say that each Pi’s Biing must be “causally between the inputs and outputs” of M’s A-ing (Craver, 2007, 13). So,
M’s A-ing, understood to have causal precursors (inputs) and effects (outputs), spatiotemporally includes all of its lower-level components. One could also say that, since the
properly organized components make up the mechanism, the mechanism must extend
wherever and whenever its components do. In short, constitution entails containment. What
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the knife’s blade does, qua component of a cutting mechanism, is contained in what the
knife does. Suppose I am prompted to visualize my sister upon hearing someone say her
name, and then I go on to think of the last time I saw her. It accords with Constitutivism to
assume that whatever neuro-physiological processes that give rise to my visualizing
activity occur while I am visualizing her, thus, after I hear her name and before I recall our
last meeting.
The requirement that the lower-level processes are contained in what they give rise
to is problematic because it is not met in certain dynamical systems. That is, a higher-order
feature of a dynamical system can be spatio-temporally more local than the dynamics that
give rise to it. A rough example of this can be depicted in a case of gravitational dynamics
slightly more complicated than the case I described earlier. Instead of just two masses,
imagine a cluster of gravitationally intertwined masses. Given the right initial conditions,
it could occur that one mass moves in a repeating pattern or even stays motionless with
respect to the disorderly meanderings of the masses around it. In such a case, the
anomalous, cyclical movement of the one mass is a higher-order feature of the system that
is shaped by gravitational relations spread throughout the system, though this movement
itself is confined to a small part of the system. The lower-order components of this system
– the masses and their gravitational acceleration towards each other – exert global influence
on the system. If you remove a mass, it can affect the paths of masses all over the system,
and if you pick a particular mass or spatio-temporal region to observe, what you observe
is liable to be affected by a change anywhere else. In such cases the higher-level
phenomenon does not contain, and so is not constituted by the lower-level processes that
explain how it occurs.

60

Cognition in Nature

3. Explanation

Ben Baker

A more relevant example might be recurrent patterns of activity in a neural network
continuously impacting and getting feedback from an environment. Within an
appropriately complicated network of this sort, we might find a few nodes collaborating in
a repeating sequence of activity. While this pattern of activity is spatially local, it could be
that connections between distant nodes or between nodes and parts of the environment are
involved in the maintenance of the local cycle of activity. Again, in such a case, the
combination of lower-order interactions that give rise to a higher-order phenomenon are
not contained in it. In the next section I closely examine another such case, involving
animal behavior. Whether the animal behavior in this case should be called cognitive is not
something I want to debate here. In order to show that we need something other than a
Constitutivist understanding of how cognition arises, it is enough to provide reason to think
that some cognitive processes might have lower-order components whose spatio-temporal
span exceeds the location of the cognitive processes themselves. literature that supports
Dynamical Basis points in this direction, because cycles of feedback between internal
processes and external effects of those processes are supposed to play an important role in
explaining cognition. The case I discuss in section 4 points in this direction by analogy,
because it demonstrates how global dynamics can give rise to complex adaptive behavior,
cognitive or not.
It is not generally easy to show, for a given cognitive activity, whether it arises
partly due to dynamics of processes outside of the brain, or rather occurs by processes
entirely in the head. Settling this for any particular activity would require a near-complete
description of the lower-level processes involved in it, which is not something we have for
any interesting cases of cognition. That said, a general lesson from the research cited in
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previous section is that the brain avoids doing work where it can. One could also say
“offloading” onto processes in the environment as a rule, rather than an exception (Berry
et al., 2019; Clark, 2008; Costa et al., 2011; Kirsh, 1995; Krueger, forthcoming; Risko &
Gilbert, 2016). (“Offloading” has a specious, intentional ring to it, to my ears, but that is
another matter). The point is, the processes that give rise to cognition significantly involve
the structure of the brain’s interaction with the body and environment. This means that if
we accept Dynamical Basis then we should also accept Uncontained Dynamical Basis:
Uncontained Dynamical Basis: Some lower-order components of the dynamical
basis of a cognitive process are spatio-temporally more global than the cognitive
process itself.

This notion of what the dynamical basis of cognition is like is incompatible with
seeing the relevant lower-order components as constituents of cognition. If the dynamics
of brain, body, and environment (at least sometimes) give rise to cognition in the above,
uncontained way, then Constitutivism mischaracterizes the relationship in terms of which
lower-level processes explain how cognition happens.
Below I will spell out an alternative view of this between-level explanatory relation,
but first I want to briefly consider an objection to the argument I have offered against
Constitutivism. If the dynamical basis of some cognitive activity partly occurs outside of
the organismal body, perhaps this just means that the cognitive process itself is located
partly outside of the body. Rather than concluding cognition does not contain all of its
lower-level bases, this suggestion says one ought to conclude that the cognitive system is
extended throughout the environment, thus containing the relevant lower-order processes
there (Clark, 2008; Noë, 2005; R. Wilson, 2014). This view of cognition as literally
extended in the environment indeed provides a way for Constitutivism to answer the charge
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I presented, though only in an attenuated sense of “containment,” as both higher- and
lower-order processes are here taken to extend globally, throughout the system.
Additionally, there are problems with this view of cognition as extended. At first
glance, some higher-order features of dynamical systems appear not to extend throughout
the entire system even though they have global components. For instance, that the
phenomenon of there being high- and low-tide extends to the moon, on this line of
reasoning, since the moon’s gravitational pull figures in the dynamical basis of the tides.
That said, if one is ready to accept that the mind extends into our tools and environment
and perhaps even others’ behavior, then one may not find it so strange that the tides would
be partly located a quarter of a million miles away. Anyway, this shows how radical a
rethinking of the locations of physical phenomena is entailed by treating higher-order
features of dynamical systems to extend wherever their explanatory bases do.
Further, seeing cognition as extended conflicts with idea of a single cognitive
system that remains constant across scenarios that differ in terms of features of the
environment but include roughly the same brain and body (Shapiro, 2019; M. Wilson,
2002). If we take an extended, “cognitive” system to be constituted by processes located
in the environment as much as in an organismal body, then distinctions between cognitive
systems look nothing in particular like distinctions individual, embodied entities; it no
longer appears that we are talking about the kind of cognitive system we set out to
investigate. Those who have tried to incorporate dynamical systems-based explanations
within Constitutivism have not grappled with the problem I describe here, to my
knowledge; they either do not appreciate the apparent locality of these higher-order
phenomena with respect to their components, or they endorse claims about cognition being
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broadly extended without critically reflecting on what more this entails (Bechtel &
Abrahamsen, 2013; Kaplan & Craver, 2011). I have more to say, in the next chapter, about
the role of an organismal body in our understanding of cognition. At this point I do not
want to further discuss the problem of spatio-temporally locating cognitive processes. If
my conclusions here hinge on whether better reasons can be offered elsewhere to reject the
view of cognition as extended, so be it. I hope to have provided sufficient reason to think
that some higher-level phenomena arise from dynamical bases that they do not contain,
and that some cognitive processes are plausibly higher-level phenomena of this kind. This
means that the explanatory relation at issue here is not one of physical parthood, that is,
constituency. Lower-level components are explanatory parts in a different sense. I am now
in a position to concisely articulate this different sense.
An express alternative to Constitutivism comes from Miracchi (2017), whose
notion of generative relations partly inspires my account here. She argues that the kind of
explanatory “basis” relation that figures centrally in cognitive science and neuroscience is
generative explanation, which she delineates by contrasting generation with identity,
causation, correlation, grounding and constitution. She describes generation as a species of
difference-making relation (Strevens, 2019; Woodward, 2003). The basic idea is that
science is generally about investigating “what makes a difference to what.” Often scientific
investigation uncovers what causes what, causal relations being one species of differencemaking relation. Miracchi points to the way that science sometimes discovers what
generates what – discovers what, synchronically and described at different scales, makes a
difference to what. This generative relation makes no commitment about metaphysical
necessity – The proposal is that, when it comes to cognitive processes, our search for
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explanations in terms of lower-level components is a search for the generative bases of
cognition. Call this view Generativism:
Generativism: Lower-level processes partly explain cognitive processes insofar
as they partly generate them; when properly coordinated, lower-level processes
collectively generate higher-level, cognitive phenomena.

Just as Constitutivism is not a view about how cognitive processes are constituted,
Generativism is not a view about how cognitive processes are generated. Constitutivism
and Generativism are both views about the sense in which a cognitive process is explicable
in terms of interactions among lower-level processes. An important difference between
generative relations and constitutive relations is that the former do not imply anything
about physical parthood, and so do not imply that the relevant lower-level processes are
contained in what they help to generate. Recall the earlier case of single mass moving
cyclically amid a collection of meandering masses, all of whose gravity effects this
patterned movement. In the terms I have now introduced, we can say that such a higherorder phenomenon is generated by components spread throughout the system, even though
phenomenon itself is local. More generally, higher-order features of dynamical systems are
generated by the coordination of lower-order components, whether or not they are
constituted by them.
There is no reason generative bases cannot be constituents at the same time;
returning to an earlier example, we can now say the blade’s “being sharp” partly generates
the knife’s cutting capacity, and is also constitutively involved in it. At the same time, an
ornamental engraving on the blade might be constitutively relevant without being
generatively relevant; various interventions on this engraving would make no difference to
whether the knife cuts, but the engraving is physically involved in the cutting nonetheless.
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Looking back to the start of the chapter, we can now say of the example of a cellular
automaton that it is a dynamical system wherein the interactions among processes in a local
area of the system are sufficient to generate the pattern of interest in that area. Generative
relations can be the coordination of processes that neatly divide into spatio-temporal parts,
or the coordination of processes whose influence is spread throughout an entire system, or
combinations of both. We should not be worried about comparing the locality of higherlevel phenomena to that of their lower order bases, because locality is not part of the
explanatory relation in question. The relation is difference-making, at a time, from a lowerorder to a higher-order description, that is, Generation.
I have tried to show the importance of this difference between Constitutivism and
Generativism and argued that should adopt the latter in favor of the former because
cognitive processes plausibly have uncontained dynamical bases. I will now try to illustrate
the main points of my discussion more precisely in the context of an example of a
dynamical systems model of a high-level, animal behavior.

4. Dynamic, Generative Bases of the Knifefish JAR

The details of this example are drawn primarily from work by Madhav et. al.
(2013), which is part of a larger body of research on the Jamming Avoidance Response
(JAR) of glass knifefish (Eigenmannia virescens). Madhav et. al. offer a dynamic systemsbased model of the knifefish’s behavior, and by representing their model in terms of the
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view I have developed here, I hope to make the notion of dynamically generated cognition
more tangible.
Glass knifefish emit an electric discharge of a variable frequency and are sensitive
to certain features of the electric field in their immediate surroundings. The interaction
between their electric discharge and objects around them affords them information about
the location of those objects. The knifefish use this interaction between electric fields to
navigate around objects in their environment, some of which are neighboring glass
knifefish emitting electric discharges of their own. If two or more knifefish are close in
proximity and the frequencies of the electric charge they generate are similar, the way that
the charges interfere with one another obstructs the fish’s ability to navigate. A knifefish
is able to successfully navigate partly because it is able to shift the frequency of its electric
discharge in the direction that increases the difference between its frequency and that of a
neighbor, thereby avoiding the problematic “jamming.” This shift is called the “Jamming
Avoidance Response” or JAR.
Madhav et. al. (2013) put individual knifefish in an enclosure with recording
electrodes and an electric signal generator. This allowed experimenters to register the
frequency of knifefish’s discharge and then feed an incoming charge into the enclosure,
controlling the difference in frequency between the knifefish’s outgoing charge and the
incoming charge that it senses, closing the loop, so to speak. The researchers used the setup
to probe the dynamics of the JAR and to develop a differential equation model of it, where
the parameters of the equation describe lower-order processes they can observe and
intervene on. According to their model, the rate of change of the knifefish’s discharge
frequency is equal to a sum of two terms (see Equation 1); one term is a function of the
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currently emitted discharge frequency, the other is a function of the difference between that
outgoing discharge and the incoming frequency. The equation relating these functions to
the derivative of outgoing frequency specifies how the that frequency changes over time.
(No deep grasp of the math below is necessary to follow my line of reasoning. I will refer
to the important elements of the equation in verbal terms, that is, in terms of frequencies,
the magnitude of difference between frequencies, and rates of change of frequencies).
Equation 1

𝒅𝒀(𝒕)
𝒅𝒕

= −𝒀(𝒕) + 𝑬(𝒀(𝒕) − 𝑼(𝒕))

A simplified version of Madhav et. al.’s (2013) global non-linear model of the knifefish
JAR. The output frequency of the fish is given by Y, the input frequency the fish senses is
given by U, and E represents a function specific to this model system. The equation here
is missing elements that would scale the values appropriately and represent the anatomical
upper and lower limits on Y(t), which the reader can take to be implicit.

I want to point out two higher-order features of the dynamic system modeled by
Madhav et al. First, there is the JAR behavior itself. This investigation of the knifefish is
prompted by the observation of the knifefish’s macro-scale capacity to “avoid jamming.”
This phenomenon is not picked out by any particular elements of the description of the
system given by Equation 1. The JAR can be described in terms of a feature of phase flow,
specifically by a repellor (the opposite of an attractor). In this case, the repellor is a part of
the system’s state-space where the difference between incoming and outgoing charges is
sufficiently small, which we label “jamming,” from which all nearby trajectories veer
away. Equation 1 logically implies that the system’s trajectory veers away from the
“jamming” parts of the state-space (given a wide range of initial conditions), but it does
not furnish us terms to specify the difference between “jamming” cases and “nonjamming” cases. Thus, to identify “jamming” cases as such, we use a level of description
that picks out the commonality in an array of veering, counterfactual trajectories.
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Another interesting, higher-order feature of this system is what Madhav et al.
(2013) call a “snap-through.” To appreciate this, first note that, in principle, the knifefish
can avoid jamming by either emitting a frequency sufficiently greater, or sufficiently less
than the incoming frequency it senses – it can dodge up or down, so to speak. This is
reflected in the fact that, given an incoming frequency, the dynamical system typically has
two, stable equilibria and Equation 1 has two stable values for Y(t). However, because there
are upper and lower bounds on the frequencies that a knifefish can emit, there are some
incoming frequencies close to these bounds where the system only has one equilibrium
solution. Thus, as the knifefish’s outgoing frequency is continuously driven up (or down)
by an incoming frequency that continuously ramps up (or down), the system’s trajectory
follows the nearer of the two equilibria until eventually that equilibrium disappears, and
the system exhibits a sudden shift to the remaining one. In other words, the system’s state
“snaps-through” to the other side of the repellor. Like the JAR itself, this characteristic
feature of certain JARs-over-time is a higher-order feature, not something represented in
terms of Equation 1 or its components. In fact, the snap-through was not initially observed
by the authors, but rather was a prediction following from their model, which they
experimentally confirmed after coming up with the model (ibid., 4279).
What are the lower-level components of the JAR? Equation 1 amounts to a lowerlevel description of the whole system, so we can identify elements in the equation as
potential components. The authors of the model explicitly identify two components of the
JAR; the two terms that are summed on the right side of Equation 1. (Perhaps a useful,
finer-grained set of components could be identified, or perhaps we should think the
addition/subtraction operation marks a privileged decomposition – in any event, this two-
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component picture will serve present purposes). According to Madhav et al., these two
terms represent competing “sensory” and “motor” components. The sensory component is
the function of the difference between immediate incoming and outgoing frequencies,
E(Y(t) – U(t)), which they call the “escape” term, and it reflects the tendency for outgoing
frequency to change in proportion to its proximity to incoming frequency. The motor
component, -Y(t), which they call the “return” term, reflects the tendency of the outgoing
charge to settle toward some pre-stimulus equilibrium.
Note that the contributions of these components to the behavior of the whole system
are global. Whatever state the system is in, both components’ values go into the
determination of the rate of change of outgoing frequency, and so also into the
determination of the rate of change of the components’ values themselves. However, the
JAR itself is not similarly spread throughout the entire state-space of the system. The JAR
occurs specifically when incoming and outgoing frequencies, U(t) and Y(t), are close
enough together that the knifefish needs to adjust its outgoing frequency. When U(t) and
Y(t) are very distant, E(Y(t) – U(t)) becomes a negligible value, so Y(t) does not change
appreciably in response to an incoming signal, so there is no threat of “jamming” to be
avoided and we observe no JAR. This suggests the JAR does not contain the sensory and
motor components as spatiotemporal parts, and so is not constituted by them. Rather, the
JAR is generated by the interaction of the components under certain initial conditions. It is
perhaps even clearer that the snap-through is more local than its explanatory bases. The
snap-through only occurs when outgoing frequency reaches an upper or lower limit, but
how it occurs is determined by the two basic components that are operative at all times
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over all states of the system. The dynamical, generative bases of the snap-through extend
beyond the location of the snap-through.

Conclusion
Dynamical systems models offer a powerful lens for investigating the workings of
cognitive systems and have important implications for the kind of explanatory relation we
rely on to understand cognition in terms of lower-order components. We must attend to the
implications about locality that come along with a view about the sense in which cognition
“arises” from a system of dynamic relations. Often we deal with systems whose
macroscopic functional properties can be decomposed along neat, spatio-temporal lines,
where constitutive relations and generative relations overlap – often but not always. I have
tried to support the thought that a cognitive system is liable not to be explicable in terms
of constituent parts, but rather in terms of dynamic, generative bases.
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The “Body” in Embodied Cognition

1. Introduction

I defend a version of the claim that cognitive processes are to be understood partly
in terms of the body of the cognitive agent. The term “Embodied Cognition” names a
school of thought that broadly tries to reveal the way cognition is shaped by the body
(Wilson & Foglia, 2017). Much of the research associated with this school focuses on the
way perceptual and motor processes are involved in cognition. Embodied Cognition
theorists broadly agree that the body is explanatorily relevant to cognition insofar as
sensory-motor machinery (on the body, outside the brain) plays an important role in
cognition. Whether the body is relevant in any further sense and what exactly we mean by
the “body” are questions that have not garnered attention in this discourse. I hope to remedy
this by setting down an account of the body that is designed to figure in a larger
understanding of cognitive processes. I frame this account by articulating the key insights
of the other approaches to the embodiment of cognition, which I aim to expand on. I then
describe a basic model of the “Body” – a theoretical construct for use as part of a theory of
cognition as embodied. The Body, on this view, is a kind of dynamically generated, selforganizing boundary that meets three formal conditions; Size Asymmetry, Contribution
Asymmetry, and a Transaction Condition. I argue that the body is explanatorily relevant to
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cognition in that the conditions for the arising of a cognitive system include the conditions
for the arising of a body.
I proceed as follows: in section 2 I clarify the principal claims about the
embodiment of cognition that set the stage for the proposal here. These include a critical
stance toward a “disembodied” view of cognition, and a view about interdependent
processes of perception and action as giving rise to cognition. In section 3, I turn to the
explanatory role of the body, looking beyond its role in sensory-motor mechanisms. After
clarifying my question and my methodology, I articulate a theory of the Body in terms of
characteristic patterns of self-organization. I then show how this notion of Body is relevant
to understanding cognition as embodied. In sum I offer a view of how we can understand
perception, action and cognition as higher-order activities of certain kinds of Bodies, and I
argue that doing so helps reveal the basic character of, and relationship between perception,
action, and cognition.

2. In Pursuit of Embodiment

2A Disembodied Cognition and Internal Symbols
The sense of “embodiment” I want to spell out here is standardly construed in a
way that opposes a view of cognition in terms of computational processing over internal
symbols. To provide some context, I want to briefly state the main ideas to which
Embodied Cognition theories critically respond. I will refer to the contrasting view based
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on internal symbols as the “classical” one. (Fodor, 1975, 1980; Haugeland, 1978; Simon
& Newell, 1971; Sternberg, 1969; Stich, 1983)
The computational role of a classical symbol – what processes it figures in and
how – is determined by the set of rules governing transitions between configurations of
symbols, that is, the syntax. Such symbols are therefore “internal” in the following sense:
what a symbol putatively does to enable cognition can be understood just in terms of the
system of symbols and syntax it figures in. Any facts about the world outside of this
computational system are extraneous to understanding how a symbol allows the system to
reach its proper output states from input states. Thus, a hallmark of such symbols is that a
symbol’s form is arbitrarily related to whatever it is a symbol for. A computational process
is abstract in the sense that its elements and the relations between them are independent
from the structure of whatever physical processes might realize the computation. In other
words, one can understand how a computational process works without understanding how
it might be concretely manifested in the world (Kaplan, 2011; Piccinini, 2015). That said,
an important part of the classical symbolic view of cognition concerns the physical basis
of the symbolic computations that putatively make up cognition; the relevant computations
are thought to be physically realized by brain activity (Churchland, 1989; Dayan & Abbott,
2001; Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003; Gauthier et al., 2019).
Thus, classical symbols are internal in a second sense – in the sense of being “in
the head.” These doubly internal symbols are at the root of the view of cognition that seems
objectionably “disembodied” to some philosophers. These two senses of the internality of
internal symbols typically come as a pair, but it is important not to conflate these two
senses, because they introduce distinct challenges. Summing up here, the point is that the
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“disembodied” view of cognition that forms a backdrop for this investigation of
embodiment asserts the conjunction of Functional Internality and Physical Internality:
Functional Internality: Cognition happens by way of operations over abstract
symbols whose relevance is determined by the syntax and state of a
computational system.
Physical Internality: The physical realization of these symbols occurs in the brain.

The internal symbols at issue here are, by definition, amodal. The body and nervous
system have various modes of interaction with the external environment, and an internal
symbol is amodal if none of these modes of interaction determine the structure of the
symbol. We can think of the relevant modes as distinct channels or dimensions that make
up one’s sensory-motor engagement with the world (or crudely, we can just think of the
canonical five senses). Processes that essentially involve sensory or motor modalities are,
on the classical view, peripheral to cognition per se. Sensory and motor systems may rely
on symbol-processing as well, but the symbols that figure in cognition are thought to
abstract away any information to do with modes of sensory-motor engagement; see, for
example, Fodor’s (1983) distinction between “Input Modules” and “Central” systems. In
other words, the structure of sensory-motor interaction with the world is external with
respect to the syntax that governs the symbol-processing underlying cognition, given
Functional and Physical Internality.
Functional Internality and the amodal nature of classical symbols are implicated in
the symbol grounding problem, which a proper understanding of embodiment should solve
or avoid (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Harnad, 1990; Müller, 2009;
Searle, 1980). Because symbols are arbitrarily related to the environment of the physical
system that realizes them, the problem is to account for how any of these symbols could be
75

Cognition in Nature

4. Embodiment

Ben Baker

about anything about the world that a cognizer acts in. In a computational systems we
design, we can interpret internal symbols as referring to objects in the world according to
our own purposes or linguistic conventions. However, these methods of fixing symbols’
meanings do not work in the case of a cognitive system, because the symbols there are
supposed to have meaning for the system itself. Thus, Functionally and Physically Internal
symbols appear cut off from the kind of semantics that cognitive states have, because those
symbols are cut off from the body’s engagement with the world. That said, some views
that seem broadly “classical” try to address the symbol grounding problem, partly in terms
of symbols in sensory processing (Fodor, 1995). It therefore seems to me that a focus on
“embodiment,” insofar as it suggests a significant shift in the landscape of cognitive
science, must go farther than saying that the extra-cranial nervous system is a nonnegligible part of the relevant symbolic computer.

2B Interdependence of Perception and Action
In the above, critical reaction to the view of cognition as computation over internal
symbols, one finds an emphasis on the way cognition is bound up with processes of
perception and action. Perceptual-motor engagement is a major focus of work on the
explanatory relevance of the body and the use of dynamical modeling approaches to
cognition. Specifically, some have developed the insight that the interdependence of
perception and action is important to understanding cognition. I describe this idea here in
order to build on it further below.
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Some actions obviously depend on perception in a weak sense. For example, if I
look around the grocery store and I do not see the apples (and do not then ask anyone to
point them out), I will not be able to buy them. But from this we would be wrong to
conclude that apple-buying generally requires visual perception. Even if we are convinced
that I must have some (perhaps distant or vicarious) perceptual access to the apples in order
to buy them, this seems a far cry from saying that my action “is bound up with” or
“essentially involves” my perception. Similarly, perception obviously depends on action
in this weak sense. If I do not go to the grocery store, I will be unable to see the apples
there (barring visual communication technology). The notion of dependence at play in
these examples is causal and is contingent on several quite specific features of the scenario.
The notion of dependence at play in the claim that perception and action are interdependent
must be a deeper and more general one than this, for the claim to be of any consequence
(Adams & Aizawa, 2001; Aizawa & Journal of Philosophy, Inc., 2007; Block, 2005). For
the moment, let us just consider the vague claim that perception and action “fundamentally
structure” each other and must therefore be understood in terms of each other. This idea
has been spelled out in several ways and there does not appear to be consensus among
Embodied Cognition supporters about how widespread this binding of perception and
action is, and how important it is to understanding cognition generally.
One way this interdependence might be spelled out is in terms of the representations
a cognitive system uses, and what determines the content of these representations. This
notion of representations is itself controversial in this context and merits its own brief
discussion. Having rejected internal symbols as the basic processing unit of a cognitive
system, one might still think that there is another, properly “embodied” way of
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understanding representations as crucial to how cognition works (Barsalou, 2008; Clark,
1998; Damasio et al., 1994; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Grush, 2004; Shapiro, 2019;
Thompson, 2007; Wheeler, 2005; M. Wilson, 2002). On the other hand, it is central to
some views of embodiment that cognition is not to be understood in terms of
representations at all (Brooks, 1991; A. Chemero, 2011; Degenaar & Myin, 2014; H. L.
Dreyfus, 2002; Hutto & Myin, 2013; O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Van Gelder, 1995).
Complicating matters further, some describe an important role for a certain kind of “maps”
or “schema” or even “symbols” in the brain but deny that these entities should be
understood as representations (Gallagher, 2005; Johnson, 2017; Varela et al., 1991). This,
I take it, is a serious point of dissent within Embodied Cognition; the theoretical camp is
divided about whether and in what sense representations are a part of explaining cognition.
This is a complicated topic and it is not one of my aims here to mend this divide. In order
to describe certain lines of thought within Embodied Cognition I will sometimes use the
term “representation” meaning to pick out whatever version of the notion is compatible
with this framework, if there is one.
Getting back on track, one way to express how perception and action might be
interdependent is via the following claim, which I call “Interdependent Contents:”
Interdependent Contents: The contents of perceptual representations refer
partly to the perceiver’s capacities for action, and the contents of the
representations of actions refer partly to the agent’s perceptual capacities.

Millikan

presents a clear version of this claim. She distinguishes between

“descriptive” and “directive” representation (Anscombe, 1957/2000) and contends that
certain representations “face both these ways at once” ((Millikan, 1995, 187). She calls
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these “pushmi-pullyu representations.” By way of example, she points to how the food call
of a hen both describes the location of food and directs her chicks to come and eat the food.
Her claims may not imply any version of Embodied Cognition, but the basic idea of
representations fulfilling dual, descriptive-directive roles brings us toward a general way
of seeing how perception and action might be essentially bound together.
Those who argue for the interdependence of perception and action tend to draw on
James Gibson’s approach to understanding visual perception (1966, 1979). Gibson
develops an influential notion of affordances, which are, in short, possibilities for action
constituted by features of an organism’s environment. For example, for humans and other
organisms with sufficiently similar bodies, an apple typically affords grasping and eating,
and a rigid surface typically affords standing-on. But an animal with a different body and
different capacities for sensation and locomotion will be met with different affordances in
its environment; whether anything at all is graspable, edible, or stand-on-able depends on
the animal. Thus, affordances also seem to “face both ways” in the sense I introduced
above, in that they describe certain facts about an organism’s environment while they are
understood relative to capacities or interests of the organism. Gibson himself offers an antirepresentationalist understanding of the role of affordances in perception and action (1979),
as have others (Chemero, 2001; Noë, 2005; O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Turvey, 1992). On the
other hand, some have supported representationalist accounts, wherein affordances make
up part of what organisms perceptually represent (Clark, 1998; Hatfield, 1991; Kelly, 2010;
Siegel, 2014). These approaches similarly maintain that perceptual capacities cannot be
understood apart from the possibilities for action, and this places bodily motion at the fore
of the investigation of the mental. That said, note that Interdependent Contents expresses a
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thesis about perception and action, not about cognition per se. More must be said to connect
this claim about interdependence to a view of cognition as embodied.

2C Perceptual-Motor Basis Loops
Consider the claim that cognitively guided behavior is a result of the following
three-stage process: first, receive information about the environment, second, internally
process that information to reach a conclusion as to the appropriate action, third, execute
the appropriate action. On this picture, the intentional movements of a cognitive being are
the outputs of internal computations that received sensory information as inputs. Less
formally, this view says that thinking is essentially what happens after seeing and before
moving. Hurley (2001) poignantly names this the “classical sandwich” view and defends
an alternative that centers on the interdependence of perception and action. She argues that
cognition emerges as a higher-order feature of processes that systematically “loop” from
perception to action, back to perception, again to action, etc. In other words, complex,
feedback-involving interactions between relatively sensory and relatively motor processes
are the basis of perception and action simultaneously, and cognition is not freestanding
from perception and action but rather arises from their interplay. Thelen and Smith (1994)
and Clark (1998) propose a similarly foundational role for “action loops” of this sort. An
example I find usefully illustrates the idea is that of performing a choreographed dance.
Even though there is a sense in which the entire sequence of moves is known ahead of time
(if one has practiced enough), performing is generally not just a matter of implementing
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pre-planned movements. The dancer is constantly adjusting the force and direction of their
motions in light of where and when they find themselves, relying on their own
proprioceptive feedback. Visual and auditory feedback are also crucial – one may be
entirely unable to perform without seeing a mirror or hearing the music. Thus, the thinking
is not done when the dance begins, but is rather bound up in the coordination of perceptual
and motor processes that the performance involves. See Kirsh (2011) for a more thorough
discussion of cognition in choreography, and Montero (2016) for an account of expertise
that describes similar forms of perception-action interdependence in phenomenological
and neurophysiological terms.
This approach has a close analogue in control systems theory, in engineering. In
order to make an artificial agent with the ability to navigate around obstacles and reach
goals in its environment, it can be quite efficient for that system to have actuators whose
activity is a function of the activity of sensors, and vice versa. A relatively simple archetype
of this is put forward by Beer (2003), whose model agent relies continuously on its own
movement to discriminate between objects to be avoided and objects to be “caught” (see
also, Brooks 1985). This line of research in engineering is closely tied to the use of
dynamical systems theory to model the agent-environment interactions in question. Beer
(1995) spells out broadly how a dynamical systems approach can guide the design of stateof-the-art, mobile robots. Reverdy and Koditschek (2018) develop a dynamical systemsbased approach to prioritizing and coordinating the goals of a mobile robot, and further
derive the conditions (and perturbations) under which the robot will successfully navigate
to its goals. Some philosophical accounts propose, more boldly, that the mind should be
understood in terms of properties of dynamical systems in general. (Gelder & Port, 1995;
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Kelso, 1995; Kelso et al., 2013; M. D. Lewis, 2005; Spivey, 2008; Warren, 2006). There
is also a cluster of recent work supporting the analysis of particular biological, neural and
cognitive systems in dynamical systems terms (Braud et al., 2018; Brette, 2019; Christoff
et al., 2016; Cowan et al., 2014; Shenoy et al., 2013)
In the previous chapter I outlined the key features of dynamical systems model that
are relevant here, which had to do with the way lower-order components give rise to higherorder phenomena in dynamical systems. There, I argued that lower-order components can
contribute to the state-changes of the system in a global way even when they give rise to
higher-order phenomena that are relatively local; lower-order, dynamical components are
not always contained in the phenomena they generate. This suggests a way to localize
cognitive processes without insisting that the system of interactions that they arise from
are similarly local, thereby painting a very different picture than that implied by Functional
and Physical Internality. If we explain cognition in terms of interdependent processes of
perception and action connected in complex feedback relations, we can better appreciate
the significance of the body and the environment in the structure of cognition (Clark, 1998;
Hurley, 2001). To pursue an embodied view of cognition then, we should frame our
investigation of cognition according to this idea, which I define as Basis Loops:
Basis Loops: Cognition arises from coordinated interactions among cyclical
processes of perception and action.

This claim leaves room for substantial debate about exactly how involved the body
outside of the skull is in cognition. It implies that cognition cannot be understood
completely in isolation from perception and action, but it allows for weaker and stronger
interpretations of how extensive the ties between thinking, perceiving, and acting are.
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On a weak reading, much of cognition could be explainable in terms of symbols
realized by neural activity in the head, just as long as the functional roles of these symbols
are shaped by an organism’s perceptual and motor capacities. One may accept Basis Loops
and yet hold that the only cognitive abilities we should expect to subsume ongoing
interactions between perception and action are very basic ones – especially those involving
bodily movement that occur over short time-spans, under variable conditions. When it
comes to cognition involving highly abstract or distal properties, one might think the
significance of sensory and motor machinery is rather remote. Consider, for example, the
ability to reason about justice, plan a large event, or solve logic puzzles. Clark and Toribio
(1994) coined the term “representation-hungry” to describe such domains of cognition,
suggesting that it is difficult to see how one could possess such abilities without relying on
brain-based representations of some sort. Some have tried to account for our competence
at such tasks in terms of representations in the brain that serve as predictions or simulations
of potential effects on the sensory and motor parts of the nervous system (K. J. Friston &
E. Stephan, 2007; Gallagher & Allen, 2018; Gentsch et al., 2016; Grush, 2004; Hohwy,
2013). Such a representational scheme depends on the cognizer’s capacities to perceive
and act (albeit somewhat indirectly), and so it is compatible with Basis Loops and with the
idea that simpler cases of cognition might not such involve brain-based representations.
On a stronger reading of Basis Loops, all cognitive activity occurs by way of boundup processes of perception and action as they occur. On this view, the sensory and motor
capacities of the body must play a role in our understanding of all cognition – brain-based
predictions or simulations of what one might perceive or how one might move cannot make
up a cognitive process on their own. Recall my earlier discussion of how the thinking
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process in the performance of dance seems to manifest as in the structure of a back-andforth between how one is moving and what one perceives. One could say, in broad strokes,
that cognition in such cases involves a coupling between the sensory-motor capacities of
the body and the relevant features of the environment – the spatial layout, the music, etc.
Such a case can arguably be understood entirely in terms of interacting processes of
perceptually-guided action and action-guided perception. As I have said, it is a matter of
dispute whether the dynamic coupling of sensory-motor capacities to the world can explain
how we cognitively engage with such abstract entities as elections and logical operators.
So, extant accounts suggest different ways that Basis Loops might be further
specified, but it has broad support as a focal point for thinking about the sense in which
cognition is embodied. My brief analysis of the thinking process involved in dance also
supports Basis Loops, and to the extent that it captures the structure of a broad range of
cognitive capacities, it supports a stronger reading of Basis Loops. Clark’s (1998)
discussion of people’s methods of solving puzzles of various kinds has an analogous
structure; one goes back and forth between attending to the puzzle board and attending to
an individual piece, perhaps rotating it or setting it in a designated area for later attending.
Again, movements and perceptions are intertwined in a way that the puzzle-solver depends
on for the task. The analogy could be imperfectly extended, for example, to a large writing
project. One’s ability to complete the project involves the ability to write the first section
without precisely knowing how the remainder will shape up, ad reviewing one’s work and
making changes to what was written or outlined along the way. This shows that feedback
relationships between what we could loosely call information-gathering and information-
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producing activities, functioning in the process of a larger information-producing activity,
are arguably very general phenomena.
That said, in the example of a large writing project, the stages of informationgathering and -producing I identified are not perceptions and bodily motions, strictly
speaking, but are themselves quite abstract cognitive achievements. If we hope to connect
Basis Loops to such achievements, we might zoom in further, on the basis of the basis…of
those abilities. After all, we might say, one does need to put fingers to keyboard and look
at a screen in order to write even the first section. Except that one can also use pen and ink
(though one shudders to think of it), complicating the question of what explanatory
relevance one’s hands and eyes have in the capacity to write a book. Such complicated
matters demand complicated models and, as I mentioned above, there is not general
agreement about the role of sensory-motor processes in tasks that demand sensitivity to
distal and abstract properties. What I want to highlight here is that the investigation of
embodiment thus far centers on issues to do with the content of representations, the
relationship between perception and action, and a dynamic, environment-inclusive picture
of the explanation of perception, action, and cognition. Focused on these issues, the
discourse has overlooked the body except insofar as it is the bearer of sensory-motor
machinery. I now propose to consider the body’s explanatory relevance in a further sense.
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3. Explanatory Role of the Body
3A What Body?
The idea that cognition must be understood in terms of interdependent processes of
perception and action suggests that the body is explanatorily relevant, but it does so
indirectly, via the fact that sensory-motor machinery is on the body, not just inside the
head. Supposing one accepts Basis Loops, one might wonder whether this is the only sense
in which the body is explanatorily relevant. Simply put, for the purposes of understanding
cognition as embodied, by “the Body” do we mean anything other than the bearer of
perceptual and motor capacities? I officially denote the question as follows:
Body’s Relevance: Is the body explanatorily relevant to cognition aside from the
way it shapes sensory-motor engagement with the environment?

I am unaware of any explicit arguments for an affirmative answer to Body’s
Relevance, but to my knowledge this matter has not been taken up in earnest in discourse
about the embodiment of cognition. Little theoretical attention has been given to a
conception of the body that stands apart from perceptual-motor activity. This strikes me as
unfortunate, both because I think it is an interesting topic and because I think the answer
to Body’s Relevance is “yes.” I therefore aim to productively complicate the discussion of
embodiment by bringing the question to the fore, and aim to develop a view that
understands the Body’s relevance in a deeper sense. The proposal here is to treat the Body
as an explicitly defined, theoretical entity that supports a larger view of cognition, so I
capitalize the term (and when I mean to refer to bodies in an intuitive, pretheoretical sense,
I will not capitalize). As I am delving into unexplored territory, my exposition will be
somewhat condensed. With luck, future work will examine this matter more rigorously.
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Informally, one may recognize a body as a contiguous, skin-bound entity that
includes all the matter that makes up an animate being at a time. Of course, cells within the
Body are constantly being shed and replaced from without. Even sudden, major changes
to limbs or organs do not seem to amount to the destruction of the Body or the acquisition
of a new one. Thus, a specific or persistent physical composition is not a necessary feature
of the Body. It is not obvious to me that even contiguity is essential, at least for the purposes
of explaining cognition. Nothing seems to rule out the possibility that the Body of an
individual cognitive being could comprise unattached parts. Arguably a colony of ants
makes for an intuitive case of a kind of scattered Body. It does seem indispensable that the
relevant sort of Body is one that is alive or self-animating. A dead “body” cannot exhibit
cognition, so it is no Body at all, in this context. Thompson (2007) and Johnson (2017),
among others, foreground the connection between cognition and life. At times these
authors seem to treat “living organism” and “body” as synonymous terms, but this is still
too vague to cut cloth when it comes to the Body’s Relevance. One wants an account of
what it is for a body to be living, and how that is explanatorily relevant to cognition.
An important idea I propose to build on in accounting for the Body is that of selforganization in a complex system whose parts interact over time. Others rely on this notion
in their understanding of embodiment (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014; A. Chemero, 2011;
Jirsa & Kelso, 2004; Kelso, 1995; Varela et al., 1991) and the formal notion itself goes
back much further (Ashby, 1953; Von Foerster & Zopf Jr, 1962). Relatively simple
examples of self-organization can be found in fluid systems. Such systems have a finegrained structure that is typically described in terms of interactions between particles
(molecules), and they can exhibit macroscopic structure, that is, patterning or order in the
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way many particles interact over time. A vortex ring, for instance, generated in the wake
of a sweeping fin, is a self-organizing pattern of activity of fluid particles. A vortex ring is
not identified in terms of the specific particle-interactions that physically realize it at a
specific space and time. Although some such particle-interactions are necessary in order
for a vortex ring to actually arise, a huge and diverse range of particle-interactions-overtime realize the pattern we identify as a vortex ring. One could say the “vortex-ring-ness”
we observe is not so much a characterization of the particle-interactions as it is a
characterization of the order of the system of fluid particles. Thus, the presence or absence
of a vortex ring is a higher-order feature of fluid systems. More specifically, the vortex ring
is higher-order with respect to lower-order features described at a smaller temporal and
spatial scale – in this case, the positions, properties, and forces between the particles that
make up the fluid. In the terms of the previous chapter, we would say the lower-order
interactions figure in the generative basis of the vortex ring; that is the sense in which they
are explanatorily relevant, lower-level processes. What might this have to do with the
Body’s Relevance?
I have articulated a view on which at least some cognitive processes are best
understood as higher-order phenomena generated by system of dynamic relationships
among processes of perception and processes of action. I want now to suggest certain other
dynamic relationships are also necessary to cognition. I propose we understand cognition
as a kind of self-organizing structure, where lower-order dynamics do not just involve
processes of perception and action but processes associated with the Body in a more basic
sense. To develop an intuition for this, some Bodily processes we might consider are those
that turn ingested food into energy used by perceptual-motor systems (partly to obtain and
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digest more food). We might also consider the bodily structures that protect internal organs
from airborne contaminants and collisions, like skin, bones, immune system, and certain
reflexive behaviors. Note that the maintenance of these protective structures is also
dependent on the continued functioning of the internal organs they protect. Also, in
complex bodies like ours, the proportions of various compounds must be kept within
specific ranges by processes whose dynamics maintain homeostasis (Cannon, 1929;
Cooper, 2008; Gershenson & Fernández, 2013). These examples suggest a rough notion of
a self-organizing Body as a coordinated ensemble of processes. Also, the processes I just
described do not involve perception and action. Such Bodily processes do not appear to
represent or relate a perceiver-agent to external objection, which processes of perception
and action do, I take it. These processes also continue, basically uninterrupted, when one
falls asleep. In short, (merely) Bodily processes lack the basic, world-involving character
of perception and action. If processes like these are relevant to understanding cognition,
then the Body’s relevance goes beyond its identity as a sensory-motor machine.
I will offer a basic model for understanding the Body as a kind of higher-order
activity generated by the self-organizing dynamics of certain systems. First, I want to
briefly clarify my methodology. I propose to start by considering a few, fairly undisputed
generalizations that apply to the bodies involved in all of the cognitive systems we have
come across. I will use these general observations to inform a basic, formal account of the
Body in terms of properties of a dynamical system. Then I will look back at cases, exploring
the implications of the formal account and checking for surprising results. After that I will
be ready to consider what this account suggests about the Body’s relevance for
understanding cognition.
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3B The Dynamically Generated Body
One basic thing to note about the bodies of cognitive systems is that they involve a
boundary with reference to which we can distinguish “internal” from “external.” A major
thing this boundary seems to do is keep internal parts on the inside and external parts on
the outside; a boundary that fails to do this will swiftly fail to be associated with a cognitive
system. Another feature of such a Bodily boundary is that the external area is much larger
than the internal area; bodies persist in an environment of which they are a small part.
However, within that small part are a host of Bodily processes involved in the maintenance
of the boundary, like the examples I mentioned above. The working order of these internal
parts is of primary importance to the way a body manages to stay around. Some external
processes are important to the body’s staying around too. In particular, sources of energy
used by the internal processes need to get from the external to the internal side of the
boundary. These are an exception to the general rule of preventing boundary-crossings.
This makes for a first-pass description of the kind of bodies cognitive systems seems to
involve – now for a formal characterization of the Body.
First, a dynamical system that generates a Body must include a boundary between
internal and external. Any measurable, spatially local discontinuity in the behavior of
lower-order processes in the system can make for such a boundary. Self-organizing
boundaries are easy enough to come by in nature – a difference in polarity, as in that
between oil and water, does the trick. The vortex ring example I discussed earlier also
involves an identifiable separation between internal and external parts of the system. To
model the Body, I propose we use systems that exhibit such a boundary and meet three
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further conditions; Size Asymmetry, Contribution Asymmetry, and the Transaction
Condition.
Size Asymmetry says that the external part of the system is much larger than the
internal part. It need not specify an exact ratio; requiring that the external part is several
orders of magnitude larger than what the Bodily boundary is safely inclusive of all the
relevant bodies we have encountered. An apparent counterexample or borderline case
might be that of a fetus in the womb. Such a system involves a coordination of processes
that maintain a skin-boundary, but the “internal” part seems to take up most of the space in
the system. Looking more closely though, this is not an adequate way to identify the
relevant, larger system. We should say that a model of a fetus could not accurately describe
how it works over any significant period of time without appealing to processes external
to the womb and even the mother. So, such a model would exhibit Size Asymmetry after
all. However, this suggests a possible case of what I will call a “Megabody,” which sustains
itself in a universe not much larger than itself. If we adopt my proposal here about how
understand cognition partly in terms of the Body, we will end up with a view of cognition
that could not apply to a Megabody. It might seem surprising that there could not be a
Megabody that exhibits cognition in anything like the sense we do. If this is an unintuitive
implication though, it is not an overly concerning one. Until we have a physically plausible
cause of a cognitively active Megabody to consider, the model of the Body I propose offers
a good fit for our purposes. If the account of embodied cognition based on this Body is
ultimately successful, it will help us make sense of the fact that cognition always is found
to occur via small bodies acting in large environments even though cognition might not
seem to have anything inherently to do with size.
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Contribution Asymmetry says that processes on the inside of the boundary make
a larger contribution to the order of the system. The relative contributions of various
processes within the system can be compared in terms of difference-making relations of
the generic sort the scientific experiments uncover, discussed in previous chapters
(Woodward 2003, Strevens 2004). To illustrate, consider a traveling vortex ring, where
particles are swirling with high angular velocity on the inside, and slowly drifting by on
the outside of the boundary. Now imagine we can choose to inject a small force into the
fluid on the inside, or at an equal distance from the boundary on the outside. If our
intervention is forceful enough, it will cause the vortex ring to promptly dissipate
regardless of whether the injection is located on the inside or outside of the boundary.
However, there is a range of interventions that will destroy the vortex ring if they take place
on the inside and not if on the outside. There are presumably also interventions with the
opposite character – certain ways to change the flow of fluid immediately outside the
vortex ring that destroy it even though the same perturbation would be tolerated on the
inside. To the extent that a self-organizing boundary is more robust to external changes
than internal changes a similar distance from the boundary, it exhibits Contribution
Asymmetry.
I take it vortex rings do tend to exhibit Contribution Asymmetry in some minimal
extend, but I have not run the relevant experiments and the precise robustness conditions
of a vortex ring are not important here. If we compare a vortex ring to single-celled
organism we will find the degree of Contribution Asymmetry far greater in the latter case
– enough to make the vortex ring case look roughly symmetric. There is a huge array of
minor modifications one could make to an internal part of the cell that would ensure that it
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quickly ceases its self-maintaining activities, and comparably very few modifications that
do this and must occur outside the cell. The array of ways to destroy a vortex ring is much
less complex, and what complexity there is does not coalesce so predominantly in the
internal part of the system. I propose we specify that, in the case of a Body, the contribution
to order of internal processes is several orders of magnitude larger than that of external
processes. This gives us a model that does not apply to vortex rings. Like the Megabody,
a vortex ring falls nearby but outside of the class of systems characterized by the two
Asymmetries just described. Putting things together, a self-organizing boundary that
exhibits these two Asymmetries is a local phenomenon, generated by potentially global
dynamic relations, where the ensemble of processes whose coordination generates the
boundary mostly occur within the boundary. This already seems to be a description of
living bodies and little else.
However, it is possible for a system to conform to the two conditions above and yet
starkly differ from the sort of bodies typically found alongside cognitive beings.
Specifically, we can imagine a system wherein the self-maintenance of a boundary is
achieved without any processes crossing that boundary. The ensemble of internal processes
could be mutually sustaining in a self-sufficient way, so that internal parts of the system
only ever interact with other internal parts, and likewise for external parts. It seems
universal that the bodies of cognitive beings are not perfectly independent in this way, but
rather depend on intake processes to gather resources that internal, body-sustaining
processes use up, and depend on processes that expel substances that build up. The
Transaction Condition says that a system exhibits a Body only if some process regularly
crossing the boundary is a component of the self-organizing dynamics of the system. This
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condition entails that, if Transactional, boundary-crossing processes are prevented, there is
some internal component of the system that precipitously increases or decreases in value
until the Body is destroyed. A system that exhibited Size and Contribution Asymmetry but
did not meet the Transaction condition would be what I call an Undying Body. Given the
fact of increasing entropy in physical systems, we can straightforwardly see why the
Transaction Condition would be met by any physical body that satisfies Size and
Contribution Asymmetry – that is, why we find no truly Undying Bodies in nature. The
complexity of the system’s internal, boundary-sustaining processes entails that the internal
part of the system must maintain a relatively orderly, low-entropy state. If this part of the
system maintains this low-entropy state despite entropy continuously increasing
everywhere, it must be because of an interaction crossing the boundary that lowers internal
entropy at the cost of increasing external entropy. The Transaction Condition is not about
entropy per se though; what it means is that the Body, although it generally involves
keeping the insides inside and the outsides out, depends critically on regular transactions
with its environment.
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Figure 4
Classification of selforganizing boundaries
according to whether
they meet conditions of
a Body.

Figure 5
Diagram of self-organizing
Body. Arrows in the bottom
level represent how the
system is changing at the
smallest scale. The middle
level portrays the way lowerorder parts organize to form
a self-maintaining structure.
Note that some components
extend into or from the space
surrounding the local pattern,
whose boundaries are vague
at this level. The top level
depicts the higher-order
process generated by these
lower-order dynamics, that
is, a Body. Arrows in the top
level represent internal and
Transactional processes.
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3C Fleshing Out the Body’s Relevance

On this account, a Body is a higher-order feature of a particular kind of dynamical
system; one featuring a self organizing boundary containing the internal parts of the
system, which take up a much smaller area than external parts but do much more as a part
of maintaining the system’s Bodily order, and where some components of the selforganizing boundary cross that boundary. Note that such a notion of Body is not subject to
ship-of-Theseus style challenges; it is precisely the manner in which the Body is everchanging, ever rebuilding itself using parts of its environment, that is at the heart of this
account. One way this notion of the Body departs from the way others have appealed to
dynamical systems is that other accounts tend describe a cognitive system as a open
dynamical system (Kelso, 1995; Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1991). The relevant
dynamical system in this picture is the whole, Body-environment system, which is closed,
and which generates the Body as a local, self-maintaining order of the system. Crucially
for my purposes here, this Body is not identified in terms of its relation to processes of
perception and action. My claim here is that a Body of this sort is relevant to understanding
cognition, because we should understand cognition as arising in Bodies of a certain kind.
On this view, the dynamic basis from which a cognitive process arises is also the dynamic
basis from which the Body of the cognizer arises.
Basis Body: Cognitive processes are higher-order activities of a Body.

This, I contend, is an important sense in which the Body is explanatorily relevant
to cognition. This depicts a basic sense in which cognition is plausibly embodied, which
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has nothing directly to do with perception and action. Not everything apt to be modeled as
a kind of Body is a cognitive being. Single-celled organisms, for example are Bodies that
seem not to perceive or intentionally act, much less think. Basis Body is compatible with
a diversity of views about perception, action, and cognition, because it says nothing about
what conditions a system must exhibit, beyond those involve in the Body, in order to be an
Embodied Perceiver-Agent or an Embodied Cognizer. To wrap things up, I will more
precisely spell out a version of a view that incorporates Basis Body, adding detail to this
account of the Body’s Relevance. To do this requires making broad claims about the nature
of perception, action, and cognition, and in less space than I have devoted to the Body.
Therefore, my discussion here will be speculative, but I hope it helps to depict the
thoroughgoing sense in which cognition can be understood in terms of the Body.
The complex, mutually sustaining processes involved in a Body make the system’s
order robust to sudden perturbations of certain of its parts, to a certain extent. This is true
even of the vortex ring; a small enough injection of force to the internal parts will not
destroy the ordered pattern of activity. However, a Body exhibits robustness along many
more dimensions than a vortex ring given the greater complexity of the ensemble of
processes involved. Further, one can define a measure of stability as a function of the
relationships among internal processes that tolerate a range of perturbations. Stability is
also varies over time, as the robustness conditions of these processes varies depending on
the system’s constantly changing state. As internal activity levels are caused to rise or fall,
the system may not be able to withstand perturbations that it previously could – the Body
becomes vulnerable to a broader range of order-breaking effects. Such a measure of
stability is implicated in the Transaction Condition; stability decays in the absence of
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necessary Transactional processes, which replenish it. Similar notions of stability and
robustness figure prominently in applications of dynamical systems models to robotics,
discussed in section 2C, above (Cowan et al., 2014; Reverdy & Koditschek, 2018).
The point of defining the sense in which a Body exhibits varying stability over time
is that it provides a norm with respect to which internal processes can be classified as
functional or malfunctional. For instance, a regular Transactional processes that stabilizes
a Body that has somewhat decayed is functional for the Body, whereas a process that
intakes material that is unneeded and just gets in the way of other internal processes,
destabilizing the Body, is malfunctional. Note that this analysis does not assume that the
Body’s most common states – the dynamics that tend to prevail when nothing unusual is
happening in the environment – are its most stable ones. The norm here is not historical or
statistical. It could be that the Body’s default or normal order, given the relevant initial
conditions, does not involve the most stable arrangement of inner processes. In other
words, it could be that some perturbations increase stability. The norm of stability is
immanent; the Body needs to be stable in order to be at all, over time. In this sense, the
Body as dynamically generated comes with its own definition of what its parts are for.
The notion of the immanent normativity of Bodily processes puts one in position to
articulate a profound role for the Body in the structure of cognition. Again, there are
multiple ways this could be spelled out and I will just offer one here. My basic suggestion
is that there is a reasonably clear way to distinguish mere Bodies from Embodied PerceiverAgents. Within the class of systems that generate a Body, one can further categorize
systems according to the character of the Bodily motion involved. A Body might not have
to move through its environment, as its stabilizing, Transactional processes might occur
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with the Body just sitting or drifting along aimlessly in its environment. That is, external
processes might regularly create the necessary conditions for Transaction. On the other
hand, in order to maintain stability, a Body might rely on internal processes to propel the
entire Bodily boundary through its surroundings, to particular locations. That is, the selforganization of a Body might or might not involve directed locomotion. Those Bodily
systems that do involve directed locomotion can exhibit many more dimensions of
stability-impacting behaviors than those that do not. This is because such a Body’s position
over short time-scales relative to distant parts of the environment is an important
component of stability, dramatically complicating the space of perturbations to which the
Bodily system will stabilize in response.
Insofar as the Body exhibits directed locomotion, internal locomotor processes
must vary according to which direction of motion is stabilizing. This means that certain
internal processes of a locomoting Body must reliably co-vary according to the Body’s
distance and direction from various external parts of the environment. In other words, for
locomoting Bodies, certain components of the Bodily system must function to carry
information transmitted from external processes to internal ones. This describes a special
kind of Transactional process. Consider a more general Transactional process that
replenishes energy resources that have decayed – in a word, ingestion. What such a process
does to help sustain the Body can be identified in terms of relations to other internal
processes, because their contribution is local to those processes. Ingestive processes
involve external (or better, external-to-internal) objects, so they do carry information about
the environment. However, one can understand the functional role of such processes just
in terms of how they modify other internal processes involved in maintaining the Bodily
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boundary; their function is not defined by the information they carry. Transactional
processes specific to locomoting Bodies function to carry information about locations in
the environment because that information must be used for motion that is directed toward
or away from those locations. Bodies that engage in directed locomotion have, by definition
motor components whose activity must be robust to the position-at-a-time of distant
objects, so they must rely on sensory components to carry information about those objects,
in addition to motor components that cause the Body to move. In other words, Bodies that
maintain stability partly by moving around rely on interdependent processes sensation and
locomotion. Such bodies seem to exhibit the normative, world-involving character of
perception and action – they provide a plausible model of the Embodied Perceiver-Agent.
To get a better handle on this account, we can apply it to some examples. To
consider clear cases first, we humans fit this model of an Embodied Perceiver-Agent, and
a living cell that picks up nutrients drifting along in the surrounding medium, lacking any
system of propulsion, is a mere Body. A borderline, quasi-locomotive case can be found in
organisms that rely on small stinging cells called cnidae to catch prey, like coral and
jellyfish. In short, such a creature sends out a small, sharp part of its body out into the
(nearby) surrounding space in a way that is sensitive to the location of an external process
(whether prey is nearby). To do this requires internal processes that function to carry
information about and move with respect to something external. But cnidarians do not need
to move the whole of their body – they do not need to move anything farther than a small
fraction of their own body’s size, and they do not need to carry information about anything
more distal than the reach of these small stinging cells. We can contrast these creatures
with the oft-discussed case of bacteria that rely on magnetosomes (Barsalou, 2008;

100

Cognition in Nature

4. Embodiment

Ben Baker

Dretske, 1986; Kelso et al., 2013; Ruth G. Millikan, 1989; Piccinini, 2018; Pietroski, 1992).
These bacteria contain processes that carry information about the direction of the Earth’s
pole, which is the adaptive direction to move in, or what my account describes as the
stabilizing direction. Supposing the movement patterns that characterize directed
locomotion involve the whole body, this view of the Embodied Perceiver-Agent applies to
magnetosomes but not to cnidarians.
One might ask, “Why the whole Body?” – why does the movement of small parts
a small distance not count as directed locomotion? Recall the reasoning behind defining
the model in a way that rules out Megabodies, vortex rings, and Undying Bodies. Given
pretheoretical observations of what are commonly taken to be bodies involves in cognition,
I looked for conditions to describe a class of dynamical systems that generate a higherorder phenomenon that behaves like bodies do. Similarly, in order to cleanly distinguish
Embodied Perceiver-Agents from mere Bodies, I want to specify a feature that a subset of
Bodies exhibit in an extreme degree, making them distinctive. This feature is a many-fold
increase in robustness that comes from relying on stabilization processes that involve
locomotion, versus a Body that passively receives all of its vital Transactional processes.
The range of motion and sensation involved in Cnidarian predation is so small that it does
not exhibit this feature. As compared to a strictly internal, ingestive process, Cnidarian
predation does not, by its nature, have robustness conditions that are orders of magnitude
more complex. Having said all this, the primary point here is not whether cnidarians
perceive, but how the preceding account of the Body figures in a larger understanding of
embodied perception and action.

101

Cognition in Nature

4. Embodiment

Ben Baker

There are several questions not answered by the kind of model I am offering. For
instance, it is not clear, based on what I have said, how to individuate processes of
perception and action, or how to determine the perceptual and motivational content we
should ascribe a Body depending on how those processes work. It is beyond my scope to
investigate those questions here. Now that I have sketched a distinction between mere
Bodies and Embodied Perceiver-Agents, the final pertinent question is this: what makes
the difference, if there is one, between an Embodied Perceiver-Agent and an Embodied
Cognizer?
Just as the Perceiver-Agent, on this view, is dynamically based in Bodies of a
special sort, the Cognizer can be understood in terms of a characteristic ordering of
perceptual-agential activities over time. Recall that the Bodies of Perceiver-Agents involve
stabilization processes that require directed locomotion, which involves being robust to
different ways the Body is positioned vis-à-vis external processes. We can thus describe
the Perceiver-Agent as engaged in a kind of meta-stabilization. The relevant stabilization
processes might, for example, be one of moving to and consuming food. The intertwining
of information-gathering and locomotor processes that the Body relies on make the foodacquiring process robust with respect to a wide array of perturbations, so perception and
action provide ways of stabilizing the Body’s (internal) stabilization process. Taking this
approach one step further, my proposal is to understand cognition as involving an
additional layer – as a meta-meta-stabilization that we roughly think of as learning.
To illustrate, I will build on the earlier example of the magnetically sensitive
bacterium, supposing it to be as simple a case we might find that fits this Embodied
Perceiver-Agent model. Imagine we can intervene in such a system by placing
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magnetically charged objects in the environment, call them “distractors.” Now let us
imagine further that some magnetically sensitive process in the bacterium varies smoothly
and monotonically as a function of both the direction of the magnetic pole and the direction
of a nearby distractor, simultaneously. In other words, some internal process carries
information about the direction of both external entities – the pole (movement toward
which is functional), and the distractor (movement toward which is malfunctional). One
could visualize this internal sensor as something like a small compass that, rather than just
pointing at the nearest pole, wobbles in a complicated way that can depend on multiple
magnetic fields.
Even if the bacterium contains a doubly-sensitive process like I just described, the
distractor might nonetheless utterly baffle the bacterium, rendering its movements aimless
or worse. This would be the case if this internal process were not connected to the
bacterium’s means of locomotion in a way that allows for guidance according to the
information it carries about both of these sources. Further, the bacterium might be baffled
by the distractors no matter how many times it encounters them (I assume that this is the
case with actual magnetically sensitive bacteria). However, it might not be this way
(stretching realism somewhat for the purposes of clarity); it could be that the bacterium is
not guided by this information-carrying structure at first, but eventually, after it repeatedly
is sent wandering by these encounters, its internal dynamics are somewhat affected
according to whether it wanders into more or less nutrient-rich waters. If an internal process
is affected by this feedback and by the yet-to-be-useful doubly-sensitive structure (within
an appropriate timeframe), the bacterium could develop patterns of motor activity that are
guided by this information. In short, by learning to use information about the direction of
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the distractor vis-à-vis the planet’s magnetism, the bacterium would learn to swim directly
where it would if there were no distractor; it would learn to ignore the distractor.
When an Embodied Perceiever-Agent is able learn in above sense – to acquire new
perceptual or locomotor abilities, or relations among them – their underlying stabilization
process is robust across an exponentially larger array of conditions than if the Body were
stuck with whatever perceptual-motor abilities it has at a time.

If one learns from

experiences with a certain kind of obstacle how to promptly locomote around that obstacle
to an intended destination, then the set of movements one can make toward that goal
becomes far more complex. In other words, the array of paths that stabilization might
involve spans many more dimensions than if the Body cannot learn to stabilize in a variety
of ways. I want to suggest that an Embodied Perceiver-Agent that learns – that explores
the space of possible patterns of perception and action, acquiring new functional processes
characteristic of its individual experience – is an Embodied Cognizer.
I have just described learning in terms of the acquisition of new perceptual-motor
paths to a particular goal, but this is arguably not the only important sense of learning here.
One can also think of learning as the acquisition of wholly new capacities or new goals.
For instance, one might “learn to write” in a sense that goes beyond merely “acquiring a
new means of verbally communicating,” and pursuing the goal of writing something or of
writing well might not be aptly described as pursuing any goal that an Embodied Agent
has always possessed. This more dramatic kind of learning, where it is not an agent’s means
that expand, but their basic capacities and aims, might also be an essential part of what it
is to be an Embodied Cognizer. If that is the case, the approach I have been outlining will
need to support some way of accounting for this kind of learning in terms of the
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characteristic behavior of certain kinds of Bodies. A more detailed examination of
perceiving, locomoting, and learning by a Body will have to be pursued in subsequent work
devoted to those topics – I have completed the inquiry I set out to here. I hope to have
offered an understanding of the Body that can serve as a productive foundation for
understanding cognition.

Conclusion
My main goal has been to advance the study of what role the body plays in our
understanding of cognition. I discussed prevailing appreciation for the body’s role in
structuring capacities of perception and action, and then I sought to uncover a more general
sense of the body’s relevance. I proposed we understand the body in terms of a kind of
self-organizing activity, characterized by an asymmetry in size, an asymmetry in the
location of processes involved in the self-organization, and a transactional relation between
internal and external parts of the system. My basic suggestion was that cognition is to be
understood as embodied in the sense of arising in systems with a Body of a particular sort.
To develop this suggestion further, I described the kind of stabilization achieved by a
Body’s internal processes, determining a normative standard with reference to the Body
and thus providing for a kind of inward-looking, proto-intentionality. I described how this
kind of stability can be meta-stable in a Body that can engage in directed locomotion,
bringing informational relations to external objects into the space of what the Body’s
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stabilization processes are robust to. This offers a way to understand perception and
intentional motion as a species of Bodily activity. Finally, I suggested that a further layer
of meta-stability achieved over the course of experience lets us model a Body as learning,
and that the characteristically flexible and individualized patterns of perception and action
that arise in a learning Body are distinctively cognitive. This, I propose, captures a
foundational sense in which the Body is explanatorily relevant to cognition.
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